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Zimbabwe adopted the Lancaster Constitution in 1980.  This constitution has been amended a 
record nineteen times.  The critic on some of the amendments is that they have undermined 
the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism.  Therefore, in the light of the fact that the tide of 
constitutionalism is sweeping throughout Africa, the dissertation critically evaluates the 
extent to which the Lancaster Constitution subsumes the basic tenets of constitutionalism.  
This evaluation is precipitated by the fact that Zimbabwe is currently grappling with drafting 
a new Constitution.  Through this evaluation the inescapable conclusion is that the Lancaster 
Constitution merely provides a veneer of constitutionalism.  Drawing from the constitutional 
experience of Anglophone African countries which include Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia; the dissertation offers some reforms which the 
drafters of the new constitution could include in the envisaged constitution.  It is argued that 
it is only after a constitution embodies the identified fundamental tenets of constitutionalism 
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I     INTRODUCTION 
A) Overview of the dissertation topic 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country on the southern hemisphere of the African continent.  Like 
most African countries it has suffered from the scars of colonialism.  The year 1980 heralded 
hope that the wounds of authoritarianism inflicted during the colonial epoch would be 
allowed to heal.  This belief stemmed from the fact that independence from white minority 
rule had been achieved alongside a constitution – the Lancaster Constitution of 1979.
1
  
Therefore, it was hoped that Zimbabwe was on course for a better future for all who lived 
within its borders.  Although the constitution was a negotiated document which was a 
compromise,
2
 it was thought that given the circumstances it was better to take it than reject it.  
Further, there was hope that once the encumbering provisions lapsed, the government of the 
burgeoning country would ameliorate whatever shortcomings were in the Constitution, so as 
to turn the document into a perfect one.  To live up to this expectation, the government had to 
ensure that the Constitutional amendments it effected inculcates constitutionalism. The 
question which is worthy of asking is whether the Constitution as it stands today reflects 
constitutionalism. 
This dissertation seeks to answer that question.  Moreover, given the fact that in keeping 
with Article VI of the Global Political Agreement
3
 the country is embroiled in the process of 
drafting a new Constitution, an answer to this question becomes imperative.  However, given 
the fact that it is impossible to properly answer such a question in the absence of a definition 
of constitutionalism, it is instructive to give an overview of its meaning.  The concept of 
constitutionalism is an age-old concept.  The core of this concept was encapsulated in the 
words of one of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution of the United States of America, 
James Madison where he stated: 
In framing government which is to be administered by men over men, the greatest difficulty 
lies in this: you must first enable government to control the governed, and in the next place 
                                                          
1
 Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended on 13
th
 February, 2009 (Hereinafter “The Lancaster Constitution” or 
“The Constitution of Zimbabwe”). 
2
 I Mandaza ‘Perspectives on Armed Struggle and Constitutionalism: The Zimbabwe model’ in I Shivji (ed) 
State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy (1991) 71, 72. 
3
 Article VI of the Global Political Agreement, 2008. 
10 
 
oblige it to control itself.  A dependence on the people is no doubt, the primary control on 
government, but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
4
  
The preceding statements highlights the embodiment of constitutionalism which is: (a) the 
idea that government should be limited; (b) that constitutionalism is about creating auxiliary 
precautions to control government power; and (c) that constitutionalism is set in 
contradistinction to arbitrary power.
5
  It will be conceded that the concept of 
constitutionalism is elusive.  Perspectives on constitutionalism vary and are contradictory.  
However, notwithstanding these subtle differences in the definition of constitutionalism, there 
is wide acknowledgment of the fact that constitutionalism embodies core elements which 
make the Constitution worth the paper it is written on.  These core elements or “auxiliary 
precautions” as Madison would prefer, have become the basic tenets of constitutionalism.  As 
will be noted in chapter III of the dissertation, the core elements of constitutionalism include 
inter alia, (but are not limited to) the doctrine of separation of powers; rule of law; bill of 
rights and entrenchment provisions; independence of the judiciary; judicial review; and the 
supremacy of the constitution. 
Therefore, the concept of constitutionalism will form the bedrock of this dissertation.  
Constitutionalism will be the yardstick used to measure whether the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe embodies constitutionalism.  In other words, the dissertation tackles the question 




In making this assessment, the dissertation will be divided as follows.  First, chapter II 
titled ‘The historical context’ will give a detailed account of the constitutional developments 
in Zimbabwe.  That chapter will outline the various amendments made to the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe.  The salient changes brought about as a result of these amendments will be 
highlighted.  
                                                          
4
 Federalist Papers no. 51 available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/magframe.asp, accessed on 19 July 
2012. 
5
 Alex Magaisa ‘Constitutionality versus constitutionalism: Lessons for Zimbabwe’s constitutional reform 
process’51, 54 available at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/30495/1/Submission4.pdf, accessed on 30 April 2012. 
6
 H Okoth-Ogendo ‘Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox’ in I 
Shivji (ed) State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy (1991) 3. 
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 Secondly, a definition of constitutionalism will be given in chapter III of the dissertation.  
In that part it will be shown that although the concept of constitutionalism is contentious and 
unsettled, some consensus exists regarding its outlook in general.  The core elements of 
constitutionalism will be noted and an argument to the effect that a constitution which does 
not embody those core elements cannot be hailed as subscribing to the notion of 
constitutionalism will be made.  Having identified the core elements of constitutionalism, the 
dissertation will engage in a comparative analysis.  That is, constitutions from Anglophone 
African countries will be utilised to note how these countries have grappled with 
constitutionalism.  The countries whose constitutions will be used are: Botswana, Ghana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia.  
The rationale for the choice of these countries is informed by two considerations.  The first 
is that some of the countries share a similar historical parentage with Zimbabwe. For 
instance: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia were at one time or the other colonised by 
Britain.  The second reason for this choice is that countries like Botswana, Ghana and South 
Africa have shown fidelity to constitutionalism.  Therefore, it is hoped that Zimbabwe can 
draw inspiration from them in crafting a constitution which includes fundamental tenets of 
constitutionalism. 
 Chapter IV of the dissertation will evaluate the extent to which the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe can be said to foster constitutionalism.  In that part, the relevant sections in the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe will be juxtaposed against the core elements of constitutionalism.  
This will be done in a bid to answer the question underlying this dissertation, which is 
whether the Constitution of Zimbabwe subsumes constitutionalism. 
 The dissertation will conclude with chapter V, which raises the inescapable conclusion 
that the Constitution of Zimbabwe merely provides for a semblance of constitutionalism.  In 
the light of this, the dissertation will proffer some advice on how this could be ameliorated.  
Furthermore, given the fact that Zimbabwe is grappling with drafting a new constitution, 
some tentative lessons which the drafters can learn will be given. 
B) Methodology 
From a methodological point of view, this is library-based research.  Both primary and 
secondary sources have been consulted.  Primary sources which have been used include inter 
alia international treaties, constitutions, international, regional as well as domestic cases, and 
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reports. Academic writings, media reports and internet sources make up the secondary 


































II   HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
A) The struggle for independence and the adoption of the Lancaster House Constitution  
 
Zimbabwe as a country could be said to have been begotten in the era of Cecil John Rhodes, 
a chief proponent of British supremacy in Africa.
1
  Circa 1894, Southern Rhodesia was the 
name ascribed to modern-day Zimbabwe.
2
  The territory now known as Zimbabwe had been 
brought under white settler control through the manoeuvres of Rhodes through the British 
South Africa Company.
3
  Initially Britain had refused to extend its imperial rule to Southern 
Rhodesia.  However, in 1923 Britain officially declared Southern Rhodesia a British colony 
with limited self-rule concentrated in the hands of the white minority population.
4
  When the 
winds of change circa 1950s-1960s started to blow,
5
 the minority government in Southern 
Rhodesia refused to be swept by the tide.  Thus, in 1965 Ian Smith passed the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence. 
 
The black population could no longer tolerate the colonial legacy which had not only 
alienated them from their rightful land, but had also disenfranchised them from national 
affairs.  Therefore, they decided to take up arms in a bid to repel white domination.  The two 
political formations at the forefront of the war for liberation were the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) led by the late Joshua Nkomo, and Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe.  After a protracted struggle, the Smith government 
acceded to negotiations which became known as the Lancaster House Conference.  
 
The Lancaster Agreement was agreed upon at the Conference, and the Lancaster 
Constitution was adopted.  This paved the way for free general elections based on universal 
adult suffrage.
6
  Mugabe’s ZANU party reigned supreme in the elections with Nkomo’s 
                                                          
1
 L Van Dijk A history of Africa (2004) 178. 
2
 Ibid at 176. 
3




 This was the time when African countries were seeking (and gaining) independence. 
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  On assuming the reins, Mugabe fostered reconciliation when he 





B) The post-independence constitution: some characteristics of the Lancaster House 
Constitution of 1980 
 
The Lancaster House Constitution was drafted as a compromise.
9
  This becomes evident if 
regard is had to the fact that the Constitution incorporated special mechanisms designed to 
maintain the status quo which was tilted heavily in favour of Britain, the former colonial 
master.
10
  These mechanisms were the reservation of twenty House of Assembly seats for the 
white population, and the prevention of the amendment of the property clause for a period of 




The Lancaster Constitution provided that the Constitution was the supreme law of the 
land.  Thus, the independency of the judiciary was ensured.  As a consequence of an 
independent judiciary, the rule of law was enshrined.   The Lancaster Constitution also 
provided for a non-executive President (who had powers akin to the British monarch), a 
Prime Minister and a Cabinet answerable to the Parliament.
12
  The Constitution provided for 
a bicameral parliament which was composed of a forty member Senate and a House of 
Assembly with one hundred members.
13
  Parliament was the supreme legislative organ, while 
the executive authority vested in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.
14
  Thus, in true 
                                                          
7
 J Hatchard ‘The Constitution of Zimbabwe: Towards a Model for Africa?’ (1991) 35 Journal of African Law 
79, 80 available at http:www.jstor.org/stable/745495, accessed on 13 April 2012. 
8
 H Holland Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter Who Became A Tyrant (2008). 
9
 I Mandaza ‘Perspectives on Armed Struggle and Constitutionalism: The Zimbabwe model’ in I Shivji (ed) 
State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy (1991)71, 72. 
10
 W Ncube & S Nzombe ‘The Constitutional Reconstruction of Zimbabwe: Much Ado about nothing?’ (1987) 
5 The Zimbabwe Law Review 1, 8. 
11
 Ibid at  8. 
12
 J Hatchard Individual freedoms and state security in the African context: the case of Zimbabwe (1993) 16 
13
 M Gwisayi ‘Theory and Practice of Liberal Democracy in the Post-Colonial State in Africa: The Zimbabwe 
Experience’ (1991-1992) 9 & 10 The Zimbabwe Law Review 110, 114. 
14
 Ibid at 114. 
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 On the land question the Constitution provided that land transactions could only be 
initiated on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis.
16
  To this end, section 16 which contained a 





C) The post-independence constitution: constitutional amendments effected to the 
Lancaster House Constitution of 1980 
 
Since independence in 1980, nineteen separate Amendment Acts have been made to the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe.  In light of the historical parentage of the Constitution some of the 
amendments were inescapable and therefore necessary.
18
  However, the preceding statement 





(i) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Act 27 of 1981 
 
This constitutional amendment came into effect on 10 June 1981.  The amendment 
introduced a number of changes.   Firstly, the qualification for membership of the Senate 
Legal Committee was amended.  Secondly, whereas, initially for one to qualify for 
membership to the Public Service Commission s/he had to have experience of five years, this 
was lowered to three years.  Thirdly, the requirement that one had to have experience of 
seven years to qualify for membership to the Judicial Service Commission was reduced to 
five years.  In toto this amendment made the above positions accessible to black lawyers. 
 
                                                          
15
 Ncube & Nzombe op cit note 10 at 6. 
16
 M Meredith ‘The State of Africa: A history of fifty years of Independence’ (2005) 619. 
17
 Ncube & Nzombe op cit note 10 at 7. 
18
J Hatchard et al Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Commonwealth 1 ed (2004)45. 
19
 For example, Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005, which introduced section 16B, a 
provision ousting the jurisdiction of the courts insofar as the constitutionality of the expropriation of land by the 
Government of Zimbabwe is concerned. 
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(ii) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Act 25 of 1981 
 
This Constitutional amendment came into effect on 31 July 1981.  In terms of the amendment 
there would be a Supreme Court separate from the High Court.  Furthermore, the 
qualification periods for appointment as a judge were specified, thus making this more 
attainable by blacks.  The membership of a tribunal tasked with considering the removal of a 
judge was reconstituted.  The amendment further made changes to the membership of the 
Judicial Service Commission as well as reducing the minimum age for appointment as a 
Senator from forty years to thirty years. 
 
(iii) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Act 1 of 1983 
 
This constitutional amendment was promulgated on 22 April 1983 with sections 14 and 15 
coming into force on that date and the remainder of the Amendment Act coming into 
operation on 1 September 1983.  A number of significant changes were brought about by this 
amendment, such as the fact that the right to dual citizenship was abolished.  Towards this 
end, Parliament was vested with the power to make citizenship laws provided that a citizen 
by birth could not be deprived of citizenship unless he was or became a citizen of another 
country.  
 
Certain revisions were effected to the provisions dealing with the publication of Acts. 
Whereas, previously it had been a prerequisite that a Minister could only be so appointed if 
s/he was a Senator or MP, this was jettisoned.  In terms of the amendment, a Minister who 
was not a Senator or MP at the time of appointment was obligated to become one within three 
months from the date of appointment.  The amendment also provided that the registrar of the 
Supreme Court or the High Court was to be given powers in terms of an Act of Parliament to 
decide preliminary or uncontested matters.  Furthermore, Senators, MPs and local councillors 
were made ineligible for appointment to commissions. 
 
(iv)  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 4) Act 4 of 1984 
 
This amendment came into force on 27 April 1984.  The amendment allowed for the 
appointment of judges for fixed period, and the retirement age was capped at sixty-five.  It 
was provided that the Attorney-General and three other appointees were to form part of the 
17 
 
Judicial Service Commission.  In addition the Office of the Ombudsman was created.  In 
terms of the amendment, the President was given the power to appoint both the Ombudsman 
and the Deputy Ombudsman on the advice of the Prime Minister.  Previously, the President 
made the appointments on the advice of the JSC. 
 
The amendment also allowed for the President to appoint the Director of Prisons and the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General.  However, the President had to act on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, after consultation with the Public Service Commission (PSC).  The previous 
position had been that the President could appoint on the advice of the PSC, after consultation 
with the responsible Minister. 
 
Furthermore, the amendment provided that the President was to appoint Police officers, 
pursuant to the advice of the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Commissioner of 
Police.  Previously, the President would appoint on the advice of the Commissioner of Police. 
In terms of the amendment the President had to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, after 
consultation with the relevant Commander, in appointing officers of the Defence Forces. 
Prior to the amendment, the President appointed on the advice of the relevant Commander.  
Thus, the net effect of Amendment No. 4 was to fortify the power of the President and the 
Prime Minister in the appointment of these functionaries. 
 
(v)  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 5) Act 4 of 1985 
 
It came into effect on 5 April 1985.  The amendment introduced salient changes into the 
Constitution.  The amendment allowed for the appointment of Provincial Governors by the 
President.  Accordingly, appointment as a governor would disqualify a person from 
appointment as President, Deputy President of the Senate, or as Speaker or Deputy Speaker 
of the House of Assembly, or as a Minister or Deputy Minister. 
 
Adaptations were made to the provisions relating to the removal of judges.  The Prime 
Minister as well as the Chief Justice could now advise the President as to whether an 
investigation about whether or not a judge should be removed from office had to be 





(vi) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 6) Act 15 of 1987 
 
As stated above, the Lancaster Constitution had created a bi-cameral legislature which was 
composed of the House of Assembly and the Senate.  The House of Assembly was staffed 
with 100 members of parliament elected directly by a popular vote.  Out of these 100 seats 
there were twenty seats which were ‘white roll’ seats and would be filled by legislators 
elected by voters who were registered on the white roll.  However, these were abolished 
when their tenure had elapsed.
20
  The reservation of 20 seats for voters registered on the 
‘white roll’ for a period of seven years had been one of the mechanisms used by the 




(vii) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 7) Act 23 of 1987 
 
The Lancaster Constitution created a non-executive President whose powers and functions 
were akin to those of the British monarch.
22
  This was jettisoned by Amendment No. 7.
23
  
This constitutional amendment constituted a major constitutional alteration to Zimbabwe’s 
political system.
24
  It transformed Zimbabwe’s political strata from a parliamentary regime 




However, for present purposes, it cannot be gainsaid that the creation of an executive 
presidency through Amendment No. 7 ushered in an era of executive terrorism in the chapter 
of the constitutional history of Zimbabwe.  With hindsight it cannot be contradicted that this 
amendment ipso facto created the centralisation of power in the hands of the executive 
President. 
 
Consequent to the creation of an executive presidency, the method of appointment of 
various functionaries was modified.  First, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of a Ministry, 
                                                          
20
 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 6) Act, 15 of 1987. 
21
 Hatchard op cit note 7 at 79. 
22
 Hatchard op cit note 12 at 16. 
23
 Constitutional Amendment (No. 7) Act, 23 of 1987, came into full force on 31 December 1987.  
24
 L Mhlaba ‘Whither parliamentary democracy: A look at recent constitutional changes in Zimbabwe’ (1989-
90) 7 The Zimbabwe Law Review 1, 4. 
25
 Ibid at 4. 
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Director of Prisons and Comptroller and Auditor-General were to be appointed by the 
President after consultation with the Public Service Commission (PSC).  If the appointment 
was not consistent with the PSC recommendation, the House of Assembly had to be notified.  
Secondly, the Attorney-General was to be appointed by the President after consultation with 
the PSC, which in turn had to consult the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).  Thirdly, the 
Chief Justice and other judges had to be appointed by the President after consultation with the 
JSC.  If the appointment was inconsonant with the recommendations of the JSC, the House of 
Assembly had to be notified.  Fourthly, the Commissioner of Police was to be appointed by 
the President after consultation with the board established under section 93(6) of the 
Constitution.  Lastly, the Defence Force Commanders were to be appointed by the President 
after consultation with the board established under section 97(7).  If the appointment was not 
consistent with the board’s recommendation, the House of Assembly had to be notified. 
These Commanders could be removed by the President after consultation with the Cabinet. 
 
Most alarmingly, the Presidential prerogatives were not to be enquired into by any court.  
This provision was introduced subsequent to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in 
Patriotic Front-ZAPU v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.
26
  In the 
Patriotic Front-ZAPU case, the Supreme Court had recognised that there were executive 
prerogatives exercisable by the President vested in him by the Constitution, such as the ones 
in section 31H of the Constitution.  The court could not enquire into those powers.  However, 
should the executive prerogatives be exercised under unlawful conditions or ultra vires, the 
court had a duty to enquire into the lawfulness of the prerogative.
27
  The Supreme Court 
adopting the formulation in the Council of Civil Service Union and Others v Minister for the 
Civil Service
28
 endorsed illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety as the three 





   The net effect of the PF-ZAPU reasoning was that whenever the exercise of an executive 
prerogative affected private rights, interests and legitimate expectations of the citizens, that 
                                                          
26
 Patriotic Front-ZAPU v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 1986(1) SA 532 (ZS). 
27
 Ibid at 540G - 541G. 
28
 Council of Civil Service Union and Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 4 ALL ER 935. 
29
 Ibid at 548D – 549E. 
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prerogative would be justiciable.  The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court resonate 




Unfortunately, the impact of this progressive decision was transitory.  This was because 
Amendment No. 7 was promulgated shielding the exercise of an executive prerogative from 
judicial enquiry.
31
  Thus, whereas the Supreme Court had sought to haul out the exercise of 
executive prerogatives from the bowels of the Presidency into the glare of legal scrutiny, the 
legislature undermined this by enacting Amendment No. 7. 
 
(viii) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 8) Act 4 of 1989 
 
This amendment provided for the appointment of a Vice-President (V-P) who was to act for 
the President in his absence.  The V-P could be given administration of any Act or Ministry, 
or Department.  However, the V-P was barred from becoming the President or Deputy 
President of the Senate, or the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the House of Assembly.  The 
amendment also provided for the Attorney-General (A-G) becoming an ex officio member of 
Cabinet and was given the right to speak in the House of Assembly.  The power of the A-G to 
direct police investigation was specified.  Thus, by providing that the A-G be a member of 
Cabinet, the amendment brought the judiciary under the influence/control of the executive. 
 
(ix)  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 9) Act 31 of 1989 
 
In terms of the Lancaster Constitution, the legislature was composed of the House of 
Assembly and the Senate.  Thus, Zimbabwe had a bi-cameral parliament.  The lower 
chamber, that is, House of Assembly was made up of legislators who were popularly elected, 
whereas the upper chamber was the Senate which was indirectly elected.
32
  However, the bi-
                                                          
30
 See President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999(4) SALR 147 
(CC); Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SALR 674 (CC). 
31
 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 7) Act, 23 of 1987 in section 2 inserted into the Constitution 
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cameral parliament was discarded in favour of a unicameral parliament.
33
  The Constitutional 
Amendment at that time was criticised on the basis that it effectively gave the President 
power to appoint thirty members of Parliament.
34
  It did this by creating the appointment of 
thirty members of Parliament through special procedures.  The Amendment provided that 
provincial governors were ex officio members of parliament.  Further it provided that chiefs 
would be members of parliament.  The net-effect of this was that the thirty members of the 
unicameral house were indirectly appointed by the President, in light of the fact that both the 





Compounding the fact that there was strict policing of members of parliament at party 
level, academics projected that the legislature was treading the course of becoming a rubber 
stamp body.
36
  It would seem that they have been vindicated in this regard.   With hindsight, 
the role of Amendment No. 9 in the creation of a parliament which was deferential to the 
executive cannot be refuted.  It can be postulated that the culture of a parliament which has 
acted as a rubber stamp of the executive is traceable to Amendment No. 9. 
 
Further, the amendment provided that a member lost his seat if the political party s/he 
represented declared in writing to the Speaker of Parliament that such a member had ceased 
to represent its interest in Parliament.
37
  This had the effect of compromising the 
independence of legislators from the political party elites since the party could unilaterally 




(x)  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 10) Act 15 of 1990 
 
The salient change effected by this amendment was that it allowed for the appointment of not 
more than two Vice-Presidents.  This amendment was a consequence of the Unity Accord 
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which had been signed between the two political formations, ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU.39  As 
a result of the Unity Accord, Joshua Nkomo (leader of PF-ZAPU) was appointed as Vice-
President in 1990.  The significance of this amendment was that it ended the problem of 
dissidence, but most importantly, it led to the co-opting of PF-ZAPU by ZANU-PF.40 
 
(xi)   Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 11) Act 30 of 1990 
 
This amendment came into effect on 17 April 1991.  In terms of the amendment, the name 
“Republic of Zimbabwe” was formally adopted.  Further, section 15 of the Constitution was 
amended to defeat the Supreme Court ruling in the case of S v A Juvenile.
41
  In A Juvenile 
case the Supreme Court had to decide whether or not ‘the imposition of a sentence of 
whipping or corporal punishment upon juveniles conflicted with section 15(1) in that it was 
inhuman or degrading’.
42
  It was held that ‘the imposition of a sentence of whipping or 
corporal punishment upon a juvenile is an inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment 
which violates the prohibition against such punishment contained in section 15(1) of the 
Constitution’.
43
  In an illustration of a culture of defying and undermining court orders which 
has permeated the political landscape of Zimbabwe, Parliament amended section 15(1) to 
provide that notwithstanding the ruling by the Supreme Court, corporal punishment of 
juveniles was still permissible. 
    
Ironically, whereas the amendment negated the progressive decision made by the Supreme 
Court, it also purported to guarantee the independence of the judiciary.  The amendment 
restated the independence of the judiciary.  Another change effected by the amendment was 
that whereas, previously MPs could not become members of the JSC, that bar was removed. 
 
 Changes were also made to the property clause (section 16).  It was provided that rural 
land was to be acquired for resettlement.  The words ‘adequate compensation payable 
promptly’ were substituted for the words ‘fair compensation payable within a reasonable 
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time’.  Further, the right of a person who had had his land expropriated to question the 
fairness of the compensation in a court of law was stifled.  
 
(xii) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 12) Act 4 of 1993 
 
The amendment reorganised the public service, removing the detail concerning the structure 
of this unit from the Constitution.  It was accordingly provided that an Act of Parliament 




The Commissioner of Police was to be the head of the Police Force, and would be 
appointed by the President.  The detail of the structure of the Police Force was removed from 
the Constitution and was also to be provided in an Act of Parliament.
45
  Furthermore, the 
amendment dealt with armed forces providing that the President would be the supreme 




The amendment confirmed that Zimbabwe follows a dual system in so far as international 
conventions are concerned.  In terms of the amendment, treaties were not to form part of 
Zimbabwean law unless included by way of an Act of Parliament.
47
  Thus, this provision 
meant that treaty-making falls within the preserve of the executive, subject to parliamentary 
ratification. 
 
(xiii) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 13) Act 9 of 1993 
 
This amendment came into force on 5 November 1993.  The amendment provided that delay 
in carrying out a death sentence was not per se inhuman or degrading.   The amendment was 
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In the Catholic Commission case, the Supreme Court held that the delays of fifty-two 
months and seventy-two months from the date the death sentence was imposed to the 
proposed date of execution were repugnant with section 15(1) of the Constitution.
49
  
Importantly, the Supreme Court was not seeking to overturn its earlier decision where the 
appeals of the prisoners against the death sentences had been dismissed.
50
  Rather, the 
Supreme Court had to ascertain whether ‘supervening events established that the execution of 





The Supreme Court held that the condemned prisoners retained constitutional protection.
52
  
It was further held that the prisoner on death row retained all the basic rights except those 
removed from him in terms of the law either expressly or impliedly.
53
  The onus was on the 
condemned prisoner to prove that the delay was inordinate; it arose not from his act; and that 
it caused acute suffering such that the infliction of the death penalty would fall foul of section 
15(1).
54
  In ascertaining whether section 15(1) had been transgressed, the relevant period of 
time spent in a condemned cell should be considered to start when the death sentence is 
imposed.
55





The Supreme Court found that it was obligated to exercise a value judgment in 
establishing whether the length of the delay fell foul of the condemned prisoners’ 
constitutional rights under section 15(1).  This value judgment should be cognisant of the 
sensitivities of the people of Zimbabwe as well as international values evident in international 
judicial pronouncements, and academic writings.
57
  Thus, the Supreme Court found that the 
delays of fifty-two months and seventy-two months respectively were inordinate.  Therefore, 
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they had to be declared repugnant with section 15(1).  In casu, the death sentences of the 
condemned prisoners were commuted to life sentences. 
 
 The government of Zimbabwe lambasted the decision, and in an attempt to mitigate the 
impact of the decision Amendment No. 13 was enacted.
58
  Two saving provisions were 
inserted into section 15(1).
59
  Thus, the impact of the landmark decision crafted by the 
Supreme Court was ephemeral since the legislature promptly amended the Constitution. 
 
(xiv) Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 14) Act 14 of 1996 
 
The amendment was promulgated on 6 December 1996.   The amendment was consequent 




  The Supreme Court in 
Rattigan had to grapple with the issue of whether the right to freedom of movement of a wife 
married to a foreign husband was undermined when the immigration officers refused to grant 
the husband permanent resident status.
62
  Chief Justice Gubbay writing for the court found 
that the constitutional right of freedom of movement accorded to the wife was devalued or 
undermined if the husband was barred from residing in Zimbabwe.
63
  Thus, the Supreme 
Court held that restricting the movements of alien husbands also restricted the freedom of 
movement of their wives.  Consequently, such restriction contravened the right to freedom of 
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In the Salem case, the Supreme Court held that the right to freedom of movement 
protected in section 22(1) of the Constitution would be rendered illusory if an alien husband 
was not allowed to engage in employment or other gainful activity in Zimbabwe.
65
  In that 
case the applicant who was a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth and permanent resident of 
Zimbabwe had sought that her husband, a British national, be allowed to lawfully engage in 
employment in Zimbabwe.
66
  That is, the applicant sought that the ruling in Rattigan be 
extended so as to incorporate the right of her husband to engage in employment or gainful 
activity in Zimbabwe.  It was argued on behalf of the applicant that this right was subsumed 
into her constitutional right to freedom of movement, which embraced her entitlement to look 
to him for partial or total support, as she resided permanently with her alien husband in 
Zimbabwe. It was contended that failure to recognise this right would jeopardise her 
unqualified right to remain in Zimbabwe.  The contention was that the wife may be 
compelled by necessity to forego her right to remain in the country and accompany her 




The court found that as had been held in the Rattigan case,
68
  it was a constitutional right 
for a wife to have her husband residing with her in Zimbabwe.
69
  Gubbay CJ held that it 
would be untenable to diminish the right to freedom of movement of an impoverished wife, 
who would have no choice but to depart with her alien husband to country where he could 
assume the role of breadwinner again.
70
  Gubbay CJ held that his would have the effect of 
differentiating between an affluent wife, who would not so have to depart, for she would have 
the means to support herself, and the poor wife who would have to depart with her husband in 




Thus, the Supreme Court construed section 22(1) to include under its ambit the right for a 
husband married to a citizen of Zimbabwe to not only reside, but to have a right to seek 
lawful employment in Zimbabwe. 
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   Regrettably, the impact of these decisions was short-lived since Parliament swiftly 
responded by enacting Amendment No. 14.
72
  The amendment had the effect of reversing and 
overruling the cases of the Supreme Court by diktat.
73
  As such, in terms of the amendment, 
marriage to a citizen of Zimbabwe does not automatically grant one the right to reside in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
(xv)  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 16) Act 5 of 2000 
 
This amendment was passed on 19 April 2000 – two months before the general elections of 
2000.  The principal effect of the amendment was to transfer responsibility for compensation 
from the government of Zimbabwe to the British government, the latter being Zimbabwe’s 
former colonial master.  The amendment provided that it was the responsibility of Britain to 
establish a fund from which compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for 
resettlement purposes would be paid.
74
  However, the government of Zimbabwe still had a 
duty to pay compensation for improvements made on the land, albeit it had to do so through 
instalments over a period of time. 
 
(xvi)  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act 5 of 2005 
 
The amendment was promulgated by the parliament of Zimbabwe in September 2005.   As 
has been the trend, the Amendment Act contained multiple changes.  It dealt with issues 
ranging from property rights, freedom of movement and also the reintroduction of the Senate 
as the apex chamber of a bicameral parliament. 
 
The amendment inserted a new section into the Constitution, namely, section 16B.  
According to section 16B, all agricultural land was to be vested in the State. The amendment 
was to have both retrospective and prospective application.  The State was not enjoined to 
pay compensation for acquired land except for improvements effected on the land prior to its 
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  Significantly, the amendment contained an ouster clause.
76
  The section 
provided that the jurisdiction of the courts of law was ousted in matters relating to land 
acquisition.  The true import of section 16B(3) is that the constitutionality of the acquisition 
of land is not justiciable.  The courts can only adjudicate on the amount of compensation 





 A challenge to the constitutionality of Amendment No. 17 was brought before the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe by Mike Campbell.
78
  The Supreme Court limited the issue for 
determination in that it made a procedural enquiry rather than a substantive enquiry.  Malaba 
JA was not prepared to interrogate the amendment to ascertain whether it comported with the 
core tenets of constitutionalism.  Rather, he focused on whether or not Parliament had 
complied with the letter of the law in enacting the amendment.  On that basis the application 
was dismissed, since the court found that the amendment had been enacted in accordance 
with the strictures of the Constitution.  
 
The applicants took the case to the SADC Tribunal where the case was heard as Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al. v Republic of Zimbabwe.
79
  The SADC Tribunal identified four 
issues it had to grapple with.  First, it had to ascertain whether or not it had jurisdiction to 
hear the matter.  Secondly, whether or not the applicants had been denied access to courts in 
Zimbabwe.  Thirdly, the Tribunal had to establish whether or not the applicants had been 
discriminated against on the ground of race.  Fourthly, whether or not compensation was 
payable for lands compulsorily acquired by the government of Zimbabwe. 
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The Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter.  His Excellency Mondlane J 
found that by having a clause ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, Amendment No. 17 was 
inimical to the rule of law.  This was because the purported ousting of the jurisdiction of the 
courts of law was repugnant to the twin fundamental human rights, namely, the right to 
access the courts and the right to a fair hearing, which were hallmarks of the concept of the 
rule of law.  Thus, by depriving the applicants of their agricultural land without affording 
them recourse in a court of law, the section deserved the greatest censure.  This is because a 
provision like section 16B falls foul of the concept of the rule of law which is a foundational 
value in a constitutional democracy.  
 
 The Tribunal opined that Amendment No. 17 is discriminatory since it indirectly targets 
white farmers.  Thus, the Tribunal embraced a tenet of constitutionalism which is that a law 
has to be general rather than being targeted at a distinct group of the population.  Lastly, it 
was opined that the government of Zimbabwe could not use its municipal law to shirk from 
its international law obligations, which proscribes expropriation of land without fair 
compensation.  In casu, it was held that fair compensation was due and payable by the 
government of Zimbabwe to the applicants for the expropriated lands. 
 
However, notwithstanding the findings by the SADC Tribunal which were in favour of the 
applicants, the Government of Zimbabwe was recalcitrant, contending that the Tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction over the matter.  At a SADC summit made up of the Heads of State of 
SADC, a moratorium was put on the Tribunal’s work.  This fuelled speculation that the 
summit had bowed to pressure from the Government of Zimbabwe. 
 
A further incident of Amendment No. 17 was that the unicameral parliament which had 
been created was jettisoned.
80
  A bicameral parliament consisting of the Senate and the House 
of Assembly was embraced.  The Senate was to consist of sixty-seven Senators.
81
  Fifty of the 
Senators were to be popularly elected, whereas, the remaining sixteen would be directly and 
indirectly elected by the President.
82
  The age for qualification as a Senator was to be forty 
                                                          
80
 Constitution of Zimbabwe  Amendment (No.9) Act, 1989. 
81
 Section 34 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
82
 According to section 34(1)(a)-(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the President had the power to appoint six 
Senators directly. He also has the power to appoint ten Senators indirectly because notwithstanding the fact that 
30 
 
years.  The amendment also provided that provincial governors of the ten provinces were ex 




(xvii)    Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 18) Act 11 of 2007 
 
The date of commencement of the amendment was 30 October 2007.  The amendment 
reduced the term of office of the President from six years to a period of five years concurrent 
with the life of Parliament.
84
  Whereas Amendment No. 17 had provided that the Senate 
would consist of sixty-six Senators, Amendment No. 18 provided that the Senate would be 
made up of eighty-four Senators.  Previously, the ten provinces could popularly elect five 
Senators each.  In terms of the new amendment each province would now popularly elect six 
Senators.  Provincial Governors of each province had their membership relocated from the 
House of Assembly to the Senate.  Thus, Provincial Governors were to be ex officio Senators. 
The President and the Deputy President of the Council of Chiefs would be Senators.  Also, 
sixteen of the members of the Senate would be chiefs, and five would be appointed by the 
President.
85
  The number of parliamentarians which had been pegged at one-hundred and fifty 
by the Amendment No. 9 was increased to two-hundred and ten. 
 
(xviii)  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 19) Act 1 of 2009 
 
The amendment was made against the backdrop of the Global Political Agreement.
86
  This 
was a power sharing deal signed by the three Principals of the three different political parties, 
namely; Mr Mugabe of ZANU-PF, Mr Tsvangirai of MDC-T, and Mr Mutambara of MDC-
M.  The deal was brokered by the former President of South Africa, Mr Thabo Mbeki.  
Schedule 8 embodying the nature of the agreement between the respective political parties 
was inserted into the Constitution.  The salient change effected by the introduction of 
Schedule 8 into the Constitution was that some executive powers no longer vested solely in 
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the President.  Rather, they were now shared by the President, the Prime Minister, and the 
Cabinet.  Thus, whereas previously the discretion of the President insofar as making certain 
appointments was not encumbered, schedule 8 fettered that discretion.  For instance, the   
President had to act ‘in consultation’ with the Prime Minister in making key appointments. 
The phrase ‘in consultation with’ in terms of the schedule is to be construed as referring to 
the fact that the consent of the consulted person has to be secured prior to a decision being 
made.  Another example highlighting the attenuation of the powers of the President is the fact 
that the President can no longer unilaterally dissolve parliament.  
    
Another significant change introduced by Amendment No. 19 is the creation of the office 
of the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is to be the Deputy Chair of the Council of 
Ministers a body established to, inter alia assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions, 
and to help the Prime Minister in attending to matters of co-ordination in the government.  
Furthermore, the amendment has introduced what has become known as ‘State Institutions 
Supporting Constitutional Democracy’.  It is to this end that the amendment provides for the 
creation of an Anti-Corruption Commission and an Independent Electoral Commission.  The 
amendment inserts a detailed structure on the organisation, functions, and powers of these 
institutions.  The object of these sweeping changes is to ensure that the goal of ‘free, fair and 
regular elections’, which belatedly has been added to the Constitution by the same 
amendment, is accomplished. 
 
D) Conclusion  
 
Academics have criticised the culture of the parliament of Zimbabwe to amend provisions of 
the Declaration of Rights arbitrarily.
87
  Arguments proffered by academics are that such a 
practise not only negates the principle of the rule of law, but it also significantly diminishes 
the impact of the Declaration of Rights.
88
  It has been argued that the amendments have 
changed the Constitutional experience of Zimbabwe into an ipso facto executive dictatorship 
with the legislature effectively assuming a rubber-stamp role.
89
  The amendments have 
accentuated the power of the executive resulting in power being centralised in the Presidency. 
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Therefore, as will be illustrated latter, overall, the amendments have negated some of the 
tenets which have become the core of the concept of constitutionalism.  Thus, as a result of 
some of the amendments, Zimbabwe has failed in its quest for a golden triptych of good 







                                                          
90




A) The concept of constitutionalism 
 
(i) The meaning of constitution 
It has been stated that the difference between a constitution and constitutionalism “is more 
than a simple exercise in semantics”.
1
  In describing a constitution some scholars have 
referred to it as a “power map”
2
 while others have likened a constitution to a “job 
description”.
3
  Bo Li has viewed a constitution as a “commitment device”.
4
  It has also been 
contended that liberal thinkers like John Locke would view a constitution as a fundamental 
aspect of the social contract.
5
  In other words, since John Locke contended for a limited 
government, it is argued that he would view a constitution as regulating the relationship 
between the governors and the governed.
6
  Therefore, what emerges is that a constitution is a 
document detailing how those in government should exercise the governmental power vested 
in them by virtue of their position.  
There is no fixed or standard form for a constitution.
7
  That is, some constitutions may be 
written, which is certainly the case with most constitutions, while others may not be written 
as is the case with Britain.
8
  However, emphasis should not be placed solely on constitutions 
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because, as has been noted, it is possible to have ‘constitutions without constitutionalism’.
9
  
Rather, the emphasis should be placed on a constitution which not only ‘veneers 
constitutionalism’,
10
 but which subsumes the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism so as to 
foster an ethos of democracy and the rule of law. 
(ii)  The meaning of constitutionalism 
Constitutionalism is not only a ‘fuzzy word’
11





  Certain scholars have distinguished between what they term the traditional 
form of constitutionalism and the modern conception of constitutionalism.
14
  In making this 
distinction it has been argued that the former focuses on procedure and restraint, while the 
latter is preoccupied with values.
15
  However, today it is accepted that this distinction has 
become blurred because constitutionalism is understood to be an admixture of both the 
traditional approach and the modern approach.
16
  This is because constitutionalism in its 
modern day conception subsumes both the prescriptive (the traditional approach), and the 
normative component (the modern approach to constitutionalism).
17
  In short, the anatomy of 
constitutionalism today consists of both procedure and values.  On the other hand, scholars 
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However, the absence of a trite definition of the concept of constitutionalism does not bar 
one from noting the content, form and features of this concept.  As such it has been observed 
that constitutionalism can be said to ‘encompass the idea that a government should not only 
be sufficiently limited in a way that protects its citizens from arbitrary rule but also that such 
a government should be able to operate efficiently and in a way that it can be effectively 
compelled to operate within its constitutional limitations’.
19
  Constitutionalism stems from an 
appreciation that, as Madison put it, ‘men are not angels’.
20
  Accordingly, it is a prerequisite 
to have mechanisms controlling them when they exercise power.  Therefore, if the ‘twin evils 
of anarchy and tyranny’
21
 which are inimical to democracy and the rule of law are to be 
thwarted, there is a need to have ‘auxiliary precautions’
22
 designed to check power. 
Constitutionalism provides an antidote to the perennial problem of tyranny,
23
 and can thus be 
construed as the ‘auxiliary precautions’ which Madison was referring to in the Federalist 
papers. 
Essentially, constitutionalism can be construed as having fundamental tenets which are 
‘irreducible’
24
 which have become accepted as the core elements of constitutionalism.
25
  
Informed by what academics have argued and the African constitutions crafted subsequent to 
the ‘third wave of democracy’
26
 the inevitable conclusion is that the fundamental tenets or 
core elements of constitutionalism are: 
(i) the provision for the recognition and protection of fundamental human rights; 
(ii) the separation of powers. In other words, the creation of a government structure 
which ensures institutional comity between the different organs of state; 
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(iii) the use of the presidential term limits as a means of restraining the powers of the 
president; 
(iv) the independence of the judiciary; 
(v) the review of the constitutionality of laws; 
(vi) the existence of provisions controlling the amendment of the constitution; and 
(vii) the establishment of “autochthonous oversight bodies”27or institutions that promote or 
foster democracy.  
Hatchard identifies good governance, constitutionalism and sustainable development as 
the golden triptych which Africa is striving towards.
28
  It is submitted that if this triptych is to 
be a lived reality there is a need for the core elements of constitutionalism to be the norm 
rather than the exception in the institutions of government in Africa. 
(iii) Constitutionalism and the rule of law 
The notion of the rule of law was given impetus by A V Dicey who defined the rule of law in 
accordance with three main principles.
29
  Firstly, the law was supreme.  Secondly, equality 
before the law had to be observed.  Thirdly, the Constitution was the result of ordinary law of 
the country.
30
  The question which arises is what is the relationship between constitutionalism 
and the rule of law?  Bo Li in answering the preceding question identifies a ‘four-fold’ 
connection between constitutionalism and the rule of law.
31
  The picture which emerges is 
that constitutionalism is symbiotic to the rule of law.  In other words, there is an umbilical 
link between constitutionalism and the rule of law.  The only discernible factor distinguishing 
the one from the other is that the rule of law is narrow in scope whereas constitutionalism is 
expansive.
32
  Inevitably, the absence of the rule of law would mean that there is no 
                                                          
27
 Ibid at 208. 
28
 Ibid at 2. 
29
 I Currie & De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law’ (2001) 75. 
30
 Ibid at 75. 
31
 Bo Li op cit note 3 where the scholar states that ‘constitutionalism forms an institutional foundation for the 
rule of law, strikes a proper balance between the rule of law and the rule of person, provides a minimal 
guarantee for the justice of both the content and the form of law, and finally, is itself safeguarded by the rule of 
law’. 
32
 Fombad, Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms op cit note 7 at 182. 
37 
 




(iv) Constitutionalism and Democracy 
 
Constitutionalism has been identified as a sine qua non of democracy.
34
  Conversely, 
democracy has been dubbed a driving force behind constitutionalism, such that without 
democracy the prospects of constitutionalism diminish tremendously.
35
  As such, democracy 
and constitutionalism are interdependent concepts which should not be viewed as 
incompatible with each other.
36
  Therefore, democracy and constitutionalism are not concepts 




B) An overview of Africa’s post-independence experience with constitutionalism  
Ghana attained independence on 6 March 1957 heralding the “wind of change” which was to 
sweep throughout Africa until 1994 when South Africa was the last of the African countries 
to gain independence.
38
  Unfortunately, post-independence Africa was besieged not only by 
woes of poverty and underdevelopment but it was also bedevilled by the lack of a culture of 
constitutionalism.
39
  In understanding why constitutionalism failed to take root in post-
independence Africa a recapitulation of the events that occurred subsequent to independence 
is necessary.  
It has been noted that constitutions adopted in Africa after the colonial epoch were arrived 
at through a “scissors and paste” process.
40
  Anglophone countries adopted constitutions 
modelled around the Westminster Constitution, albeit modified since the elements of the 
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United States presidential system were added.
41
  On the other hand, Francophone countries 
adopted the Gaullist constitutional model which hybridized the Westminster parliamentary 
system and the US presidential system.
42
  In light of the historical legacy of Africa, where 
administration had been based on authoritarianism and power had been centralised, African 
leaders construed these constitutions as an affront.
43
 
As such, the state elites preoccupied themselves with subverting the constitutional order.  
They did this by brazenly ignoring the constitution, abrogating it or brandishing it as a 
liability through political rhetoric.
44
  Therefore, the constitution emerged recast providing for 
an imperial president who was omnipotent and had pre-eminent discretion in making 
appointments and dismissals.
45
  State elites squeezed out constitutionalism from these 
constitutions as they pursued reconstruction of the power map.
46
  The rulers who assumed 
power after independence have been said to have fostered a culture of ‘Big man rule’.
47
  
These rulers became known as “WaBenzi” symbolising the amount of power they had at that 
time.
48




However, in 1990 what has been termed the “third wave” of democracy swept across 
Africa.   A groundswell of discontent with poor economic management, nepotism, cronyism 
and maladministration propelled this ‘third wave”.
50
  Although scholars refute the extent to 
which the “third wave” succeeded,
51
 what is not refutable is that this wave ushered in an era 
of constitutionalism.  Although some unpleasant relics from the ancien régime seem to be 
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 this does not negate the fact that the “third wave” has led to constitutionalism 
taking root in Africa.  For instance, whereas the ancien régime condoned “perpetual 
incumbency”,
53
 nowadays it is frowned upon with presidential term limits swiftly becoming 
the norm.
54
  Attention will now be turned to identifying and discussing those elements which 
have assumed the status of core elements of constitutionalism with the object of noting how 
they have been interpreted in the African context. 
C) The fundamental tenets of constitutionalism 
At the outset it must be noted that the list of what has become the core elements of 
constitutionalism is not exhaustive.  Although seven core elements of constitutionalism were 
noted, only five of those will be discussed in this work.  These are: the separation of powers; 
presidential term limits; independence of the judiciary; provisions controlling the amendment 
of the constitution; and the establishment of institutions that foster democracy.  
The raison d’être for this is that these five elements of constitutionalism have been 
egregiously negated in the Lancaster Constitution.  For instance there has been a ‘damning 
assessment on the independence of the judiciary’
55
 which has been labelled by some as a 
system which has become a ‘cornucopia of irrelevance’.
56
  The Lancaster Constitution has 
been subject to a number of constitutional amendments which have denuded traits of 
constitutionalism from that constitution.  As such, it would be instructive to consider the 
mechanisms adopted by other countries to curb constitutional amendments which are 
whimsical.  Furthermore, the separation of powers has been blurred such that the legislature 
has been accused of merely playing a rubber-stamping function.
57
  Moreover, the incumbent 
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President has exercised powers with longevity mainly because of the absence of a 
presidential term limit in the Lancaster Constitution.   It is therefore instructive to consider 
how the countries forming part of this study have grappled with these five core elements of 
constitutionalism. 
(i) Separation of powers: 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers is informed by the same perspective which led Lord 
Acton to caution that ‘all power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’.
58
  
This perspective is the one which was expressed by Madison when he said that in the exercise 
of power there is a need to create “auxiliary precautions”.
59
   This doctrine of separation of 
powers has since become ‘an important touchstone of constitutional democracy’.
60
  In other 
words, separation of powers has assumed the status of a fundamental tenet of 
constitutionalism. 
 
Charles Louis de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu has been celebrated as an exponent of 
the doctrine of separation of powers.
61
  In his seminal work, “The Spirit of Laws”, 
Montesquieu propounded that government has to be separated into three different arms, 
namely executive, legislature and the judiciary.
62
  He further advocated that ‘power should 
check power’.
63
  In other words, he was contending for what the Americans have called 
“checks and balances”, or as Madison would put it, “auxiliary precautions”.  In 1787 the 
doctrine of separation of power was given expression by the Americans.
64
  The American 
Constitution provides for the separation of powers, albeit with nuanced changes.
65
  These 
nuanced variations to the pure theory of separation of powers manifest themselves in the 
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The doctrine of separation of powers has had a tortuous path in its evolution since it was 
expounded by Montesquieu.  In spite of this, the underlying object of the doctrine has been to 
thwart tyranny.
67
  In the African context the doctrine of separation of powers manifest itself 
in three types, namely the American Presidential system, the British parliamentary system 
and the French hybrid system.
68
  Anglophone countries amalgamated the American 
presidential system with the British parliamentary system to come up with a hybrid, while 
Francophone countries have embraced the French hybrid system.
69
   It would be imperative to 
briefly note the manifestation of the doctrine of separation of powers in Africa.  However, as 
a preface, a note on the three types of systems which the crafters of constitutions in Africa 
had to choose from suffices.  
 
The British parliamentary system recognises the three arms of government, but envisages 
a close relationship between the legislature and the executive.
70
  Notwithstanding this, Britain 
still has separation of powers because the three different arms of government exist in their 
exclusive domains, and incursions into the domain of the other should be in terms of the law. 
The United States Presidential system provides for a form of constrained parliamentarism.
71
  
It provides for the sovereignty of the constitution and its corollary is an independent judiciary 
with strong powers of review.
72
  The US Constitution also provides for a system of checks 
and balances among the three organs of state.  The French hybrid system does not embrace a 
strict form of the separation of powers, but allows for close co-operation between the 
executive and the legislature.
73
  The French system has a number of peculiar features which 
include inter alia, vesting the power to review the constitutionality of the law in a quasi-
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administrative body; making the President the guardian of the courts; and giving residual 
legislative power to the President.
74
  Making the President the guardian of the judiciary 
denotes a hierarchy among the three arms of government, which is not the case with the 
Westminster and the US presidential system. 
 
The extent to which the doctrine of separation of powers has been given effect to in the 
constitutions of the countries forming part of this study will now be considered.  The study 
will focus particularly on the two arms of government, namely the executive and the 
legislature.  Specific consideration will be on the relationship between these two arms, and 
the manner through which they exercise power. 
 
All the constitutions of the countries studied provide for the separation of powers between 
the executive, legislature and the judiciary.
75
  The President in most jurisdictions under 
consideration is elected directly by the electorate in terms of universal adult suffrage.
76
  In 
Botswana and South Africa, the popular election is for members of the legislature who then 
elect the President.
77
  However, despite these differences, the President in those countries is 
both the head of state and head of government.
78
  The term of the President in most of the 
constitutions surveyed in this study has been limited to two terms.
79
  In some of the 
jurisdictions under investigation the President has an unfettered discretion when exercising 
executive powers.  However, in certain jurisdictions the President has to seek parliamentary 
approval when exercising some of the executive powers.
80
  Hatchard stresses that the utility 




                                                          
74
 Ibid at 317. 
75
 See Art 1(3) of the Constitution of Namibia as an example. 
76
 Section 80(2) of the Constitution of Malawi; Art 63 of the Constitution of Ghana; Art 27 of the Constitution 
of Namibia; Art 34 of the Constitution of Zambia. 
77
 Section 32 of the Constitution of Botswana; and Section 86(1) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
78
 Section 47(1) of the Constitution of Botswana; Art 58 of the Constitution of Ghana; Art 29 of the Constitution 
of Namibia; Art 34 of the Constitution of Zambia; and Section 83(a) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
79
  Section 34(1) of the Constitution of Botswana; Art 66(2) of the  Constitution of Ghana; Section 83(3) of the 
Constitution of Malawi; Art 29(3) of the Constitution of Namibia; Section 88(2) of the Constitution of South 
Africa; and Section 35(2) of the Constitution of Zambia. 
80
 Art 78(1) of the Constitution of Ghana. 
81
 Hatchard et al op cit note 26 at 73. 
43 
 
In most jurisdictions where the President is elected directly, the president can only be 
removed through a cumbersome process of impeachment.
82
  However, these jurisdictions do 
not debar the legislature from passing a vote of no confidence in the members of the 
executive, in which case the member must resign or be fired by the President.
83
  In certain 
jurisdictions like Botswana, the Constitution allows for the legislature to pass a vote of no 
confidence in the President.
84
  However, the usefulness of this mechanism is doubtful since 
the provision operates as a “double-edged sword”.
85
  That is, once the legislature passes a 
vote of no confidence on the President, Parliament is dissolved.  Thus, such a provision might 
have the effect of coercing the legislators against passing a vote of no confidence in the 
President.  Furthermore, the existence of anti-defection clauses in most of the constitutions 
has been identified as having the effect of constraining the legislators from voting against the 
President as they fear expulsion from their political parties.
86
  It is submitted that the best 
approach that fortifies the utility of votes of no confidence is to be found in the Constitution 
of South Africa.  In terms of section 102 of the Constitution of South Africa, if the National 




In some jurisdictions the President has the power to determine the sessions of 
parliament.
88
  It has been submitted that this is anachronistic and it undermines the business 
of parliament.
89
  South Africa and Namibia have jettisoned this practice.  In terms of the 
South African Constitution, once the first sitting of the National Assembly has taken place, 
the National Assembly determines the time and duration of its future sittings.
90
  A provision 
with a similar import is found in the Namibian Constitution which provides that the National 
Assembly sits for at least two sessions during each year, which commence and terminate on 
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Moreover, in certain countries like Botswana and Namibia, the President may dissolve 
parliament.
92
  It is submitted that this impinges on the doctrine of the separation of powers 
and undermines the business of parliament. Further, it is submitted that should a need to 
insert such a provision exist, the better approach would be the one that is found in the 
Constitution of Namibia.  The Constitution of Namibia in Article 57 contains a “suicide 
provision”.
93
  That is, once the President dissolves parliament his/her term ends as well.  Such 
a provision may serve to dissuade a President from dissolving parliament on whimsical 
grounds. 
 
An appraisal of the constitutions studied evinces that same persons forming part of the 
executive do form part of the legislature.  For instance according to section 91(3) of the South 
African Constitution, the Vice President and cabinet ministers are members of the legislatures 
since they are appointed by the president from parliament.
94
  Such an approach vindicates the 
conclusion that although Anglophone African countries have embraced the US presidential 
system, they still retain the Westminster system which is characterised by a close cooperation 
between the legislature and the executive.  
 
With regard to the manner through which Bills become law, a few comments would 
suffice.  Certainly, in all the countries forming part of the study, a Bill only becomes law 
when the President assents to it.  Differences arise with regard to the procedure utilised in the 
law making process.  Two camps emerge.  On one hand, there are those jurisdictions where it 
is discretionary for the President to assent to a Bill
95
 and on the other hand, countries like 
South Africa make it peremptory for the President to assent to a Bill.
96
  Botswana is one such 
country where the President has discretion as to whether to assent to a Bill or not.
97
  
According to the Constitution of Botswana, the President may assent to a Bill or failing 
which, automatically dissolve parliament and call for fresh elections.  It has been noted that 
the threat of dissolution, ‘... is likely to persuade parliamentarians to comply with presidential 
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  This problem is more apparent than real in the light of the fact that initiation of 
the law making process is now de facto the preserve of the executive.  
 
However, given the fact that, ‘...Parliaments generally have dutifully legislated in 
accordance with presidential wishes...’
99
 it should be peremptory for the President to assent to 
a bill.  The South African position provides a useful approach.  Section 79 makes it 
peremptory for the President to assent to a Bill unless she/he has reservations.  If she/he has 
reservations the Bill is referred back to the National Assembly for reconsideration.
100
  After 
the National Assembly has reconsidered the Bill, and his/her concerns have been addressed, 
the President has to either assent to the Bill or refer it to the Constitutional Court for 
determination of its constitutionality.
101
  Once the Constitutional Court pronounces that Bill 
is constitutional, the President has no discretion but to assent to and sign the Bill into law.
102
  
This procedure ensures that the ‘...President [does not] block the passage of legislation and at 




Overall, constitutions of Anglophone countries can be said to have embraced the doctrine 
of separation of powers.  Thus, owing to the presence of separation of powers, countries such 
as Botswana, South Africa and Ghana have been lauded as exemplars of constitutionalism.  
In stark contrast, constitutions of Lusophone and Francophone African countries have been 




In the final analysis it appears that the doctrine of separation of powers at the very least 
requires an understanding that certain matters are in the realm of one arm of government, and 
thus not exercisable by the other.  The argument for the separation of powers in Africa 
becomes more compelling when regard is had to the history of our continent which has 
wobbled under the colossal weight of the ‘big man’ syndrome, executive hegemony, and 
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  Therefore, it is irrefutable that the doctrine of separation of powers 





(ii) Presidential term limits 
As has been highlighted above, most constitutions in post-independence Africa were 
reconstituted such that the new “power map” did not provide for presidential term limits.  As 
such there was a proclivity among the state elites to monopolise the office of the President 
and hold power in perpetuity.
107
  This had detrimental repercussions because the state elites 
arrogated to themselves power so as to ensure that no one could oust them from office. This 
heralded what Prempeh has referred to as “executive hegemony”.
108
  As a result, the 




In light of the tendency of African leaders to monopolise and arrogate power, the 
argument for having presidential term limits to curb executive excesses becomes forceful.  
The problem of not having presidential term limits is that ‘it elevates the president into a cult 
and an institution, thus turning the office into an inheritance’.
110
  The argument for 
presidential term limits refers to an appreciation of the fact that Africa has suffered from an 
authoritarian past where the executive has annexed power for itself.  Such power led to the 
emergence of an “imperial president”
111
 who exercised power without restraint.  Thus, one 
way of curbing a resurgence of “executive hegemony” in light of the dawn of legislatures 
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which are characterised by domination of one political party in a multi-party system is 
through presidential term limits.
112
 
Therefore, it is now clear that presidential term limits should be construed as constituting a 
fundamental tenet of constitutionalism.
113
  This is because presidential term limits curb the 
proclivity of staying in power for too long.  In short, presidential term limits end “perpetual 
incumbency” and fosters peaceful and democratic transition of power between presidents 
subsequent to elections.  As such, Africa’s constitutional landscape has been changed by 
presidential term limits since “perpetual incumbency” which was a common feature in the 
ancien régime has been jettisoned.
114
 
Nevertheless, although there are a string of leaders who have adhered to their term 
limits
115
 there are those who have successfully amended their constitutions to remove 
presidential term limits.
116
  Furthermore, there are incumbents who have continued to hold 
power in perpetuity, notwithstanding the tide of presidential term limits that is sweeping 
through Africa.
117
  This has led to Prempheh contending that African presidents have ‘been 
term limited but have not been tamed’.
118
  The question which arises is what can be done to 
fortify presidential term limits in light of the fact that they can be emasculated.  The answers 
are considered below. 
Presidential term limits can be fortified by entrenching them in the Constitution.
119
  In 
other words, in order to curb prolongation of incumbency through amending the term limits, 
the constitution could provide for a cumbersome process to be followed when an amendment 
to the presidential term limit is envisaged.  Therefore, the onerous process could entail the 
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requirement of special parliamentary majorities, such as two thirds of the members, as well as 
making the amendment subject to a referendum.  The other method would be to include 
provisions dealing with presidential term limits under provisions which cannot be amended. 
For example the Constitution could provide for the tenure of the president to be a maximum 
of two terms.  This is because two terms have been said to be ‘long enough for any 




To conclude, presidential term limits have become a standard provision in Africa
121
 since 
what Africa needs, as Prempheh notes, are ‘flat prohibitions and bright-line rules, and not 
open-ended or discretionary provisions’.
122
  If Africa is to curb “presidential hegemony” a 
ghost from the ancien régime
123
 the answer lies in presidential term limits.  It can now no 
longer be gainsaid that presidential term limits are a core element of constitutionalism
124
 




(iii) Independence of the judiciary 
 
The presence of a judiciary which is independent ensures that controls on executive power, or 
the “auxiliary precautions” as Madison would prefer, do not become redundant.
126
  Judicial 
independence can now be considered to be a fundamental tenet of constitutionalism.
127
  This 
is because the creation of a constitutional system where the constitution is supreme inevitably 
necessitates the existence of a judiciary which is independent.  Judicial independence has 
been recognised at an international and regional level.
128
  There have also been various 
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It has been noted that independence of the judiciary is ‘foundational to and indispensable 
for the discharge of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy based on the rule of 
law’.
130
  Further, it has been noted that the independency of the judiciary is an indispensable 
cornerstone of a constitutional democracy.
131
  The argument for an independent judiciary 
tasked with controlling the executive is rendered more forceful in the context of Africa where 
there has been a culture of imperial presidents.
132
  The presence and existence of an 
independent judiciary is a hallmark of constitutionalism which is crucial if a country is to be 




Although judicial independence has no settled definition,
134
 it is trite that judicial 
independence embodies three characteristics, namely security of tenure, personal 
independence and institutional independence.
135
  In The Queen in Right v Beauregard
136
 it 
was held that the core principles central to the independence of the judiciary was the 
‘complete liberty of individual judges to hear and determine cases before them independent 
of, and free from, external influences or influence of government, pressure groups, 
individuals or even other judges’.
137
  This means that judicial power is exercised by the 
judiciary, and may not be usurped by the legislature, the executive or any other institutions. 
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Judicial officers exercise their powers subject only to the Constitution and the law, not the 
whims of public opinion or of the majority in Parliament. 
 
Gleaning from the myriad declarations and statements relating to the notion of judicial 
independence, Fombad has propounded six core elements of judicial independence.
138
  These 
are: institutional arrangements for judicial autonomy; financial arrangements for judicial 
autonomy; presence of arrangements pertaining to security of tenure; adequate remuneration; 
transparency in the appointment process; and judicial accountability.
139
  A consideration of 
these elements as adumbrated above in the context of Africa is pertinent for the purpose of 
this study. 
 
For the judiciary to exercise its proper role in a constitutional democracy which is to act as 
the guardian of the rights enshrined in the Constitution it must be independent. Judicial 
independence envisages that judicial functions must vest exclusively in the judiciary.
140
  That 
is, the Constitution must contain a clear statement of judicial independence.  For instance, the 
Namibian Constitution provides that the courts are independent making them only subject to 
the Constitution or the law, and barring the executive or the legislature from interfering with 
its role.
141
  The Ghanaian Constitution also provides for a robust guarantee of judicial 
independence as it provides that the judicial power vests in the judiciary, and the President 
and Parliament are barred from exercising the functions of the judiciary.
142
  Provisions with 
the same import as the one in the Namibian Constitution have been inserted in a number of 
Constitutions in the Anglophone countries.
143
  The utility of vesting judicial functions 
exclusively in the courts is that it inhibits the executive or the legislature from bypassing the 
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The goal of judicial independence is rendered illusory if the appointment process is not 
transparent.
145
  Although there are diverging views insofar as how the appointment of judges 
ought to be made, there is consensus that the process must be imbued with sufficient 
checks.
146
  The raison d’être for the checks is to prevent the appointment of judges who are 
beholden to the executive or the legislature.  In most Anglophone countries political 
involvement in the appointment of judges is allowed.
147
  The notable differences relate to the 
degree or the extent to which such political involvement is warranted. 
 
In countries like South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho the Constitutions distinguish 
between the appointment of the Chief Justice and the rest of the constitutional court judges as 
well as judges of other courts.  In the case of South Africa, the President is not bound by the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) when the Chief Justice is being 
appointed.
148
  However, there is some level of constraint on the President since he or she has 
to make the appointments after consulting the JSC as well as the leaders of the parties 
represented in the National Assembly.
149
  In Lesotho and Botswana the President is bound by 
the advice of the JSC when making such an appointment.
150
  Namibia arguably provides the 
best model which insulates the judges from political influence, since the President has to act 




Most African constitutions provide for a certain body to be responsible for the 
appointment of the judiciary.  The rationale for this is to ensure the independence of the 
judiciary.  However, if this body is an alter ego of the President then the prospect of judicial 
independence is stifled.
152
  As such, the composition and structures of these bodies must be 
such that they inhibit political meddling in their decision-making and functioning.
153
  The 
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constitutions of Namibia, South Africa and Ghana arguably provide for a greater scope of 
independence of the judiciary by thwarting political meddling in the composition of the JSC. 
 
It has been contended that security of tenure is the sine qua non of judicial 
independence.
154
  Most of the Anglophone African constitutions guarantee security of tenure 
by providing for the number of years judicial officers can be in office.  However, a disturbing 
feature in these constitutions is the provision for the hiring of expatriate judges on fixed term 
contracts.
155
  This appears to be irreconcilable with the need for security of tenure, since 
pressure might be brought to bear on an expatriate judge under the apprehension that his/her 




Mechanisms dealing with how judges are removed from office are vital since they might 
have a bearing on the independence of the judiciary.  As such, it has been observed that to 
curb an abuse of the powers to remove judges a stringent and detailed criterion for such 
removal must be provided for in the constitution.
157
  In other words, to prevent judicial 
officers being removed at the whim of the executive, the body or commission tasked with 
investigating and recommending or making the decision on whether a judge must be removed 
must not be staffed by political appointees.  South Africa has developed a largely transparent 





Another basic characteristic of judicial independence is that the remuneration of judges 
has to be secured by law.  This is intended to thwart machinations of political pressure which 
might compromise the independence of the judiciary.  Most Anglophone countries provide 
that judicial salaries are to be paid from a Fund which is administered by Parliament.
159
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  Judicial independence of the courts has been fortified by the expansion of their scope of 
judicial review. The Constitution of South Africa has entrenched both abstract and concrete 




It cannot be refuted that judicial independence in Africa is facing challenges.  For 
instance: the appointment of judges in certain jurisdictions is flawed; progressive judgments 
made by the courts have been negated; and extra-legal means have been used to remove 
judges from office.
161
  However, this does not mean that the prospects of judicial 
independence are bleak.  Constitutional provisions in jurisdictions like South Africa and 
Botswana epitomise commitment to judicial independence, and overall they highlight fidelity 
to constitutionalism.  Furthermore, notwithstanding the challenges noted, there has been a 
spirited commitment by the judiciary to foster the ethos of constitutionalism by acting boldly 
to enforce the spirit and object of the law.
162
  Thus it appears that a constitution which does 
not provide for an independent judiciary is not worth the paper in which it is written since an 
independent judiciary has become one of the core elements of constitutionalism. 
 
(iv) The control of constitutional amendments 
 
A constitution differs markedly from national legislation in that it is the supreme law – lex 
fundamentalis.
163
  From a philosophical point of view, a constitution can be equated to what 
Kelsen would term the “Grundnorm”.  That is, the constitution is the highest normative 
document from which other norm-giving documents find their legitimacy.  Having noted that 
a constitution is a supreme document, two questions arise for consideration.  Firstly, whether 
or not a constitution should be amended?  Secondly, if a constitution can be amended, how 
should it be amended?  These two questions are considered in the subsequent paragraphs. 
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A survey of the constitutions of Africa, particularly constitutions of Anglophone African 
countries, evince that there is a general consensus among constitutional engineers that 
although a constitution is supreme, it is not immortal.  That is, constitutional drafters of 
African constitutions have realised that it is possible for a constitution to contain 
“imperfections”
164
 since human beings are “infallible”.
165
  As such, there ‘is an inherent 
right’
166
 for a constitution to be amendable.  The rationale for contending that a constitution 
should be amendable is that societal values are fluid; as such, constitutions which cannot be 
amended might become anachronistic and antiquated.
167
  Sunstein has noted that 
‘constitutions should be amended by each generation in order to ensure that the dead past 




Having noted that constitutions are not cast in stone, the next question falling for 
consideration pertains to how a constitution ought to be amended.  Although views diverge 
on this question, what is notable is that there is an appreciation that a constitution should not 
be ‘casually, carelessly, or brazenly amended’.
169
  That is, scholars opine that it is necessary 
to control amendments to a constitution by having “formal procedural safeguards”.
170
  
Therefore, providing for mechanisms to control the amendment of a constitution has become 
a core element of constitutionalism.  Some of the “formal procedural safeguards” which have 
been incorporated in the constitutions of African countries are highlighted below. 
 
Some Anglophone African countries have adopted the amendment procedure as provided 
for by the Westminster model.
171
  The Westminster model provides for a special 
parliamentary majority procedure as well as the publication of the Bill in the Government 
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Gazette not less than 30 days before parliament votes on the Bill.
172
  The Westminster model 
has been copied in jurisdictions like Zambia and Zimbabwe.
173
  This model has been 
criticised by Hatchard on two fronts.  Firstly, it has been argued that it is premised on the 
fallacious view that parliament is the guardian of the constitution.
174
  Secondly, it has been 
contended that it is an anomalous procedure in the sense that despite the replacement of 
parliamentary sovereignty by the supremacy of the constitution, an exclusively parliamentary 




A dual thread which runs as the raison d’être of the special parliamentary majority is to 
ensure that the constitution is not amended for partisan purposes, and to ensure that the 
interests of minorities are protected.
176
  However, the requirement for special majorities in 
parliament has proved ineffectual in the face of “imperial presidents” and single dominant 
parties in the legislature.
177
  In other jurisdictions like Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi and South 
Africa the special parliamentary procedure is not the sole procedure, but it is part of the 
amendment process.
178
  For instance, in South Africa the Constitution provides for the second 
chamber to play a role in the amendment process.
179
  However, the effectiveness of this is 




The Malawian Constitution provides that amendments to the fundamental principles or 
human rights in the Constitution do not only require a simple parliamentary majority, but also 
needs the support of the majority of voters in a referendum.
181
  In counties like Ghana
182
  the 
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drafters have coupled the requirement for special parliamentary majorities with the addition 
of “strict time lines”.  The South African Constitution provides for a “cooling-off” period as 
part of the time lines.
183
  This provision was inserted into the Constitution of South Africa 




Thus, it would seem that although there might be variations on how the amendment 
procedure is carried out, there is an appreciation that the constitution as the supreme law 
deserves to be protected from “retrogressive amendments”.
185
  It is now trite that for a 
constitution to comport with constitutionalism it has to provide for mechanisms controlling 
the amendment of the constitution.  Therefore, it is irrefutable that controlling amendments to 




(v) The “Fourth Branch”: oversight bodies that foster constitutionalism 
 
One vision which a constitution may have is a constraining vision.
187
  According to this 
vision, government has to be limited when exercising power and such power should be 
exercised in accordance with the law.
188
  It is clear that the constraining vision resonates with 
constitutionalism which attempts to impose limitations and ensure that such limitations are 
legally enforceable.
189
  Therefore, there is a need to create institutions which ensure that 
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power is exercised in accordance with the law.  These institutions are what have been referred 




These national institutions are designed to ensure that government is held accountable in 
the exercise of its power.
191
  The rationale for having national institutions is the belief that 
accountability of the government would ensure that the ethos of constitutionalism will 
thrive.
192
  The Paris Principles were adopted by the United Nations as a clarion call to 
member states to create national institutions to enhance the protection and promotion of 
human rights.
193
  Govender has submitted that the Paris Principles envisage that that these 
national institutions must be more than ‘surrogate court of law’.
194
  This means that these 
institutions must be seen as ‘a product of the new constitutionalism’.
195
  This 
constitutionalism requires that the relationship between the organs of state and these national 
institutions to be one where the organs of state assist and protect these national institutions to 




Some of the national institutions, or – ‘oversight bodies’ – which have been created in a 
number of African constitutions include inter alia the Ombudsman, the Human Rights 
Commission, and the Anti-Corruption Commission.  However, most of these constitutions 
state the powers and functions of these institutions in purely hortatory terms.
197
  This is 
insufficient at the very least, and at the very most it is incompatible with the Paris Principles 
which require that these national institutions must be given a broad mandate in terms of a 
constitutional or legislative text.
198
  Fombad contends that most of these national institutions 
have become ‘like a prize champion fighting with his hands tied on his back’.
199
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It has been propounded that for these national institutions to be truly independent, which is 
a requirement made explicit by the Paris Principles, there are six requirements which have to 
be in place.
200
  These are: demonstrable independence; adequate resources; accessibility to 
citizens; power to inquire into the widest possible range of complaints; adequate investigatory 
powers; and appropriate remedial power.
201
  Hatchard opines that in the absence of the above 
elements these national institutions will become a ‘front and a façade lacking any 
relevance’.
202
  It has been submitted by Fombad that for these national institutions to be 
effective they should be ‘constitutionally entrenched in such a way that they can operate as 




The drafters of the South African constitution attempted to heed that call in crafting what 
has been oft-referred to as “Chapter 9 institutions”. Six institutions under the heading “State 
Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy” are listed in that Chapter of the 
Constitution.
204
  However, the Constitution does not stop at merely listing, but uniquely lists 
four foundational principles which have been noted by Fombad as “ensure[ing] that these 
institutions are an effective log to the constitutional wheel and not a political charade of 
symbolic value’.
205
  In sum these four foundational principles impose both a positive and 
negative injunction on the state.  That is, on the one hand, these institutions have to be given 
unequivocal support by the government in fulfilling their constitutional mandate, while on the 
other hand the government is prohibited from interfering with the workings of these 
institutions.
206
  Therefore, the South African Constitution demonstrates that to secure the 
independence of these national institutions the provisions dealing with these institutions have 
to be detailed and entrenched in the constitution. 
 
It cannot be gainsaid that institutions such as the Ombudsman, the Human rights 
commission, the Anti-corruption commission, the Auditor general, and the Electoral 
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commission have become vital if the philosophy of constitutionalism is to take root in 
Africa.
207
  However, the true extent of the success of these institutions hinges on the political 




D)  Conclusion 
 
Constitutionalism is symbiotic to democracy and is a sine qua non for the rule of law.   
Furthermore, constitutionalism subsumes certain elements which have become fundamental 
tenets if the twin ideals of democracy and the rule of law are to become a lived reality.  These 
elements which have become the core of constitutionalism have been identified above, as 
being: the separation of powers; judicial independence; presidential term limits; the control of 
amendments to the constitution; and the existence of oversight institutions. 
 
The tide of constitutionalism is sweeping across Africa.  Thus, it is now up to the leaders 
of our time to allow the tide of constitutionalism to sweep out all the relics of the ancien 
régime which include inter alia imperial presidency, Big-man rule, and executive hegemony. 
Therefore, our leaders need a Damascene conversion from a culture of ‘constitutions without 
constitutionalism’
209
 to a culture of ‘constitutions with constitutionalism’.  It is only once our 
leaders embrace constitutionalism that the evils of tyranny, despotism and dictatorship that 
have bedevilled the motherland can be confined to the dustbins of history.  As such, our 
leaders must embrace constitutionalism and put an end to the view that some regimes in 
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IV THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE OF ZIMBABWE 
The main aim of this chapter is to evaluate the current Constitution of Zimbabwe.
1
  This is 
done with a view towards delineating the extent to which the Constitution subsumes what has 
become known as the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism. The chapter will be divided 
into seven parts.  Part A will focus on how the doctrine of separation of powers has been 
crafted in the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  In this part it will be argued that the Constitution in 
its current form does not comport with the doctrine of separation of powers as it is understood 
in theory as well as in practice in the jurisdictions which subscribe to constitutionalism.  
Thus, ways in which the shortcomings identified could be ameliorated will be provided. 
Part B tackles the question of whether there is merit in the argument that the envisaged 
new constitution should include presidential term limits.  In this part, it will be highlighted 
that as was noted in chapter III, presidential term limits have become a core element of 
constitutionalism.  As such, it is a prerequisite that the envisaged constitution should 
incorporate a provision dealing with term limits.  
Part C notes that to date nineteen amendments have been made to the Lancaster 
Constitution.  Since these amendments have negated the fundamental tenets of 
constitutionalism, this part will discuss methods through which those kinds of amendments 
can be avoided.  Part D highlights that owing to a series of constitutional amendments; the 
Lancaster Constitution now only provides a veneer of judicial independence.  Therefore, a 
discussion on how the independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe can be restored will be 
done.  In Part E an argument is made for the inclusion of institutions that ensure 
accountability and constitutionalism.  In that part, it will be noted that such institutions play a 
crucial role in fostering and cementing constitutionalism.  
Finally, Part F is a conclusion which sums up the constitutional experience of Zimbabwe.  
The inescapable conclusion reached is that the Constitution of Zimbabwe merely provides a 
semblance of constitutionalism.  In the light of this conclusion, some tentative constitutional 
reforms to mitigate the dearth of constitutionalism will be proffered. 
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 Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended on 13
th
 February, 2009 (Hereinafter “The Lancaster Constitution” or 




A) The Lancaster constitution and the separation of powers  
In form, the Lancaster Constitution appears to embrace the doctrine of trias politicas as it 
separates the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary.  However, this is a far cry from the 
reality.  The Constitution provides for a President who is the Head of State and Government 
as well as the Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces.
2
  Similar to the position in the 
United States of America,
3
 the President of the Republic is directly elected in terms of 
universal adult suffrage.
4
  It has been noted in the previous chapter that this is not 





   
Differing markedly from the Constitutions of other jurisdictions which provide a two-term 
presidential limit
7
 the Constitution of Zimbabwe only provides that the term of office of the 
President is five years which runs concurrently with the life of Parliament.
8
  The removal of 
the President can be done through a process of impeachment.  The Constitution provides that 
where the President has acted in wilful violation of the Constitution, or is incapacitated, or 
where he or she is guilty of gross misconduct, then the President can be removed by 
impeachment.
9
  The process of impeachment requires that one third of the members of the 
House of Assembly recommend such removal and two thirds of the members of the House of 
Assembly vote in favour of the resolution.
10
   
It is submitted that in the era of political party hegemony and party elitism it is unlikely 
that a President would be impeached.  This is because it is doubtful whether the legislators 
enjoy the independence and the political will to bring the executive arm of government to 
account.  One of the reason attributed as a cause of the loss in independence on the part of the 
legislators is the electoral system.  It has been argued that a proportional representation 
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system based on a party list system has created party-elitism with the aristocrats of the party 
able to coerce the members to tow the party lines.  As a result of this, there have been calls 
(in the South African context) for the establishment of a Mixed Member Proportional 
Representation electoral system.
11
  Those calling for such a system believe that constituencies 
provide legislators with a degree of independence from their political parties as they would be 
accountable downwards as well as upwards.
12
  Although, there is merit in such an argument, 
the experience of Zimbabwe (which follows a constituency system) highlights that ultimately 
regardless of whichever system is chosen, the prospects of success hinge on the political will 
of the legislators.   
The Constitution of Zimbabwe attests to the fact that some persons forming part of the 
executive also form part of the legislature.
13
  This section provides that the Vice President, 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers have to be Members of Parliament so as to preserve their 
tenure of office.
14
  On one hand this is a useful mechanism which ensures that the Vice 
President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers account to the legislature since they are also part 
of that arm of government.  However, on the other hand, such a provision skews the balance 
of power between the two arms of government in favour of the executive.  This is so because 
it creates the impression that the ultimate price in political life is to ascend to the office of 
Minister.  Thus, it produces a mould of legislators who are pliant and timid. 
Section 31F of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is a vote of no confidence clause.
15
  A 
properly phrased and enumerated vote of no confidence provision is one of the mechanisms 
through which the legislature can control the executive.  Section 31F provides that Parliament 
needs a two thirds majority to pass a vote of no confidence in the government.  If a vote of no 
confidence is passed, the President has three options, which are: to dissolve the Parliament; to 
remove the Cabinet members; or to resign from office.
16
  Two features distinguish the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe from that of South Africa.  First, whereas in South Africa a 
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distinction between a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet and in the President is made,
17
 no 
such distinction is made in Zimbabwe.  According to the South African Constitution if a vote 
of no confidence is passed pertaining to the Cabinet, the President has to reconstitute the 
Cabinet.  However, a vote of no confidence in the President means that s/he must resign.
18
  In 
the spirit of checks and balances, the Constitution of South Africa fetters the legislature’s 
power to remove the President by providing that the vacancy in the office of the President 
must be filled within thirty days.
19
 
Secondly, whereas the Constitution of Zimbabwe requires two thirds of the Members of 
Parliament to vote in favour of the motion,
20
 only a simple majority of Members of 
Parliament in South Africa have to support the motion.
21
  It has been noted by Judge Dennis 
Davis that it is a constitutional right of minority parties to require Parliament to hold a debate 
on a motion of no confidence in the President as matter of urgency because it is in the public 
interest to do so.
22




 It might well be argued that the approach in South Africa is distinguishable from the 
constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe where the President is voted for directly by the 
electorate, and thus the legislature has no power to remove the president on the basis of a vote 
of no confidence.  The reason for this is because of the concept of ‘temporal rigidity’ which 
refers to the fact that the tenure of a President who is directly elected is fixed and difficult to 
change.
24
   However, it is submitted that by allowing the President to dissolve parliament 
when a motion of no confidence is passed in him/her, it might have the unintended 
consequence of creating a hierarchy between the executive and the legislature.  Thus, the 
threat of dissolution renders the potential gains provided by a vote of no confidence illusory 
due to the fact that threat of dissolution of Parliament may lead Members of Parliament to 
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think twice before passing such a resolution.  It is submitted that section 102 of the 
Constitution of South Africa provides a better provision. 
Certain matters are placed beyond the reach of the law.  Section 31K makes certain 
decisions of the President unreviewable by a court of law.  This is unpalatable as it is at odds 
with the rule of law.  Further, it risks impunity and flies in the face of the doctrine of 
separation of powers which envisages that there should be checks and balances in the 
exercise of power.  Therefore, an effective check on the exercise of governmental power is 
removed.  For example, section 31I empowers the President to grant pardon to convicted 
prisoners.
25
  Gubbay attributes the flagrant abuse of the presidential power of pardon to the 
fact that the courts are barred from reviewing the decision of the President.
26
  Moreover, 
arguments to the extent that the President has used it for partisan purposes have been made. 
 This contrasts starkly with the approach enunciated in South Africa where the presidential 
power to pardon is reviewable under the principle of legality.
27
  This principle is a judge- 
made substantive power of reviewing the exercise of public power to ascertain whether it 
complies with the constitution.  In the context of the presidential power to pardon, the 
jurisprudential pronouncements in South Africa reveal that although the power to pardon 
constitutes an executive action,
28
 it involves the exercise of public power which must comply 
with the constitution and the doctrine of legality.
29
  This means that in exercising the power 
to pardon, the President must act in good faith, must not misconstrue his or her powers, must 
consider the application and must act rationally.
30
  
 It has been noted that rationality is a minimum threshold requirement applicable to the 
exercise of all public power by members of the executive and other functionaries.
31
  In Ryan 
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 Ngcobo CJ held that the doctrine of legality implicitly includes the requirement that 
a rational nexus should exist between the exercise of power and the purpose sought to be 
achieved through the use of the power.  In that case the doctrine of legality and rationality 
was extended so as to encompass the requirement of procedural fairness in appropriate 
circumstances.
33
  In the JSC case
34
 the Supreme Court of Appeal noted that rationality 
contemplated that reasons ought to be given for a decision taken in the exercise of public 
power.  Commenting on the presidential power to pardon, Govender notes that  as a result of 
the seismic shift brought about  by the principle of legality in the exercise of public power, 
‘proper processes, lawful and rational decisions, and adequate justification, must be deemed 
to be the minimum standard’.
35
  Therefore, it is now trite in the South African context that in 
using the power to pardon in section 84(2)(j) the President must act lawfully, in good faith 
and rationally.  
Therefore, unlike Zimbabwe where the presidential pardon is exercised by the President 
on fiat, the presidential pardon in South Africa is considered public power and has to be 
exercised within the strictures of the Constitution.  The new constitution should make the 
power of pardon subject to the glare of legal scrutiny.  Further, it should provide for a 
criterion through which the power is to be exercised in order to control exercise of executive 
power.   It is submitted that the following jurisdictional factors must exist before the power of 
pardon can be used: it must be exercised in consultation with others who are in a position to 
render advice; there should be a legitimate governmental objective; and reasons for the 
pardon should be disclosed.
36
 
Like in other jurisdictions, no Bill may become an Act of Parliament in Zimbabwe without 
the President appending his/her signature to it.
37
  Zimbabwe is set apart from other 
jurisdictions in that the arrangement in the Constitution is ‘far less constructive and more 
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  The President may either assent to or withhold assent to a Bill.
39
  The 
President is provided with the power to dissolve parliament if he does not want to assent to a 
Bill.
40
  It is unclear whether the term of the President also expires when such dissolution is 
made.  It is submitted that the preferable interpretation is that the term of office of the 
President also expires because of the fact that the term of the President runs concurrently with 
the life of Parliament.  Construing section 51(3b) to be a “double-edged sword”
41
 will ensure 
that the President does not block the passage of legislation.
42
  
 However, it may be argued that this debate is merely academic.  This is due to the fact 
that de jure law-making has become the preserve of the executive, thus it is unlikely that the 
President will withhold assent to a Bill.  Moreover, in most cases Cabinet members introduce 
Bills after having discussed them in Cabinet meetings chaired by the President, and the party 
whips ensure that the Bill sails through Parliament without much hindrance.
43
  
Notwithstanding this, it is novel that the new Constitution should make it peremptory for the 
President to assent to a Bill.   Such an approach affirms the independence of Parliament, and 
simultaneously ensures that Parliament does its job which, after all, is to make laws. 
The President is empowered by the Constitution to fix the sessions of Parliament.
44
  It has 
been argued that this is not only outmoded but also undermines the business of parliament.
45
  
This provision has to be jettisoned and the drafters of the new constitution could look to the 




 for inspiration on an alternative solution as 
these provide a better approach, underscoring the fact that the legislature is not a rubber 
stamp body of the executive.  Furthermore, in line with the Constitutions of Botswana and 
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Namibia, the Constitution of Zimbabwe vests in the President the power to dissolve 
Parliament.
48
  It is submitted that such a provision may serve to coerce the legislature to be 
pliant to the wishes of the executive.  Therefore, the envisaged new constitution could either 
jettison the provision or utilise the method used in Namibia.  The Namibian Constitution in 
Article 57 contains a “suicide provision”.
49
  Such a provision operates as a “double-edged 
sword” in the sense that once the President dissolves parliament his/her terms expires as well.  
The preceding analysis highlights that the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for a 
semblance of separation of powers.  In form the Constitution of Zimbabwe typifies both the 
Westminster model and US presidential system but in reality it operates differently to those 
two systems.  The balance of power amongst the three arms of government is skewed in 
favour of the executive, especially the Office of the President.  This resonates with the history 
of Africa where the executive branch of government arrogated power in its own favour.  For 
all intents and purposes, the other two arms of government, namely the legislature and the 
judiciary, have been rendered impotent.  The dominance of the executive (especially the 
Office of the President) has led to Parliament being reduced to a rubber stamp body and 
degenerating to a sub-committee of the ruling party.  Owing to the stance of the government 
to confront and frustrate the judiciary, provisions which state that these arms of government 
are separate and independent of each other have been rendered nugatory.   
Since this has been as a result of constitutional amendments, it might be instructive to 
adopt the basic structures doctrine.  Although the basic structures doctrine will be discussed 
later, it would be recommended that the new constitution should entrench the separation of 
powers between the legislature, executive and the judiciary as a basic structure.  The 
advantage of this is that any constitutional amendment which threatens the separation of 
powers would be invalidated on the ground that it attempts to destroy the basic structure of 
the constitution. 
B) The Lancaster Constitution and presidential term limits 
It is now clear that presidential term limits are a conditio sine qua non of constitutionalism.
50
  
There is no clause dealing with the term limit on the tenure of the President in the Lancaster 
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Constitution.  Section 29(1) merely provides that the ‘term of office of the President shall be 
a period of five years concurrent with the life of Parliament....’
51
  In fact the incumbent 
President has held power since an executive presidency was created through Constitutional 
amendment no. 7 in 1987.  Prior to the amendment, the incumbent had been the Prime 
Minister from the 18
th
 of April 1980, being the day when Zimbabwe attained independence 
from white minority rule.  This is a total of thirty-three years.  
 Arguments why presidential term limits have become a core of constitutionalism will not 
be repeated again here since they were highlighted in part III.  The issue which might seize 
the drafters relates to whether the clause providing for term limits should have retrospective 
application or prospective application.   It may be argued that in the spirit of constitutionalism 
the term limit must be retrospective.  The advantage of this is that it cures the mischief 
towards which the limited term was targeted.  The essence of a limited presidential term 
militates against the proclivity to cling to power which countenances democracy and fosters 
autocratic rule.
52
    
There is also room for arguing that a constitution which provides for retrospective 
application in some instances and not in other instances evinces a sleight of hand on the part 
of drafters.  Others have argued that the new constitution should set an age limit to the office 
of the President.  It is submitted that such arguments are driven by political considerations 
and turn a blind eye to the fact that this would bar potentially brilliant statesman who would 
have entered politics later in life. 
In the final analysis, the constitution should not be used as a platform to fight political 
battles.  Rather, it must evince a desire to address and ameliorate the shortcomings of the past 
that has led Zimbabwe into the political doldrums.  Thus, it is submitted that the new 
constitution should provide for a presidential term limit which is two terms and has 
prospective application.  This is because the electorate will decide whom they want to lead 
them as their President.  As such, it is unjustified for the drafters to exclude a person solely 
on the basis of age.  Furthermore, the new constitution should provide that the presidential 
term limit cannot be amended.  This is because term limits are now part of the basic structure 
of the constitution and thus cannot be amended.  In any event, Zimbabwe does not suffer 
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from a bankruptcy of leaders.  Moreover, it teaches the nation to rely less on the chance 




C) The Lancaster Constitution and the control of constitutional amendments 
In chapter II it was shown that the Lancaster Constitution of Zimbabwe has undergone 
extensive constitutional reconfiguration, having been amended 19 times.  It was also noted 
that the net effect of these amendments has been to recast the Lancaster Constitution.  The 
two amendments, namely, Amendments no. 16 and 17 which authorised land reform without 
compensation and ousted the jurisdiction of the courts have come under scathing criticism.   
It has been said that they are: 
  ‘... without modern parallel in any constitutional democracy worthy of its name. They set 
Zimbabwe apart from all members of SADC, the British Commonwealth and the African 
Union, which function as constitutional democracies. They violate Zimbabwe’s international 
law obligations, most immediately through its membership of the AU. They entail the 
abrogation of constitutionalism and elevate fiat of the executive and legislature over the 




The pressing question is: how did this happen?  This question and the answers to the 
question will be interrogated below. 
The Lancaster Constitution provides for a special parliamentary majority procedure as 
well as the publication of the Bill in the Government Gazette not less than 30 days prior to 
parliament voting on the Bill.
55
  Thus, a two-thirds majority is the appropriate special 
parliamentary majority which has to be garnered in order for the Constitution to be 
amended.
56
  The House of Assembly may bypass the Senate where the Senate has withheld 
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consent to a Constitutional Bill.
57
  However, this can only be done after 180 days have 
elapsed since the Senate has withheld its consent.
58
  Further, the Constitution provides for 
specified time lines.  That is, a period of 30 days must elapse between the publication of the 
proposed Constitutional Bill in the Government Gazette and its tabling in any of the two 
houses of parliament.
59
  Notwithstanding this mechanism, amendments which have abrogated 
the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism have been passed.  In light of the foregoing, there 
is a need for the drafters of the new constitution to devise a mechanism to control 
constitutional amendments.  Some of the mechanisms which the engineers could consider are 
highlighted below. 
Informed by the philosophy of John Locke it has been reasoned that people are the 
guardians of the constitution, thus they must be involved in the amendment process.
60
  Thus, 
a “double-locking mechanism” whereby the amendment must not only be supported by a 
special parliamentary majority, but by the public through a national referendum has been 
advocated for.
61
  In the same vein, Fombad proposes that in the face of the hegemony of 
monolithic political parties the apposite method would be the one that requires that a certain 
number of voters vote in favour of the amendment.
62
  This approach is used in the Malawian 
Constitution which provides that a constitutional amendment to the Bill of Rights can only 
take place if it obtains the imprimatur of the majority of voters in a referendum.
63
 
The new constitution could be insulated from being brazenly and capriciously amended by 
inserting strict time lines into the amendment process.  The mechanism provided for in the 
South African Constitution could be instructive.  A “cooling-off period” to ensure that a 
constitutional amendment is not rushed through parliament is provided.
64
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The “basic structures” or “essential features” doctrine has been advanced as one of the 
methods which can thwart constitutional amendments which have the effect of undermining 
the foundations of the constitution.  The basic structures doctrine was enunciated and given 
impetus in the Indian case of Kesevanda v State of Kerela.
65
  The majority in that case held 
that ‘whatever procedure was adopted to amend the Constitution, it could not amend the 
Constitution so as to abrogate any of its essential features or basic structures’.
66
  The Indian 
Supreme Court further developed the doctrine in the Raj Narain case.
67
  Chandachud J held 
that: ‘[[t]he Constitution] did not confer power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or 
destroy the essential elements or basic features of the Constitution. …The word ‘amendment’ 
postulates that the old Constitution must survive without loss of identity’.
68
 
The basic structures doctrine envisages the court engaging in a two-pronged approach, 
namely stating the chief features of the constitution and then applying these features so as to 
assess whether the amendment violates essential features.
69
  Although no court in the 
Anglophone African countries has explicitly embraced the basic structures doctrine, it has 
been implicitly endorsed.
70
  The basic structures doctrine seems to have been favoured by the  
Constitutional Court of South Africa in an obiter statement in the case of Premier, KwaZulu 
Natal and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others.
71
  Mahomed DP 
noted that: 
 ‘...it may perhaps be that a purported amendment to the Constitution following formal 
procedures prescribed by the Constitution, but radically and fundamentally restructuring and 
recognising the fundamental premises might not qualify as an “amendment” at all’.
72
   
The basic structures doctrine was noted in the UDM case.
73
  However, the court found it 
unnecessary to consider the kinds of amendments that would not qualify as amendments at 
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all.  It has been noted that ‘the doctrine is waiting in the wings since, should certain 
circumstances and a crisis situation arise, its application could be invoked by the 
Constitutional Court ’.
74
  Although no judgment has as of yet expressly endorsed the doctrine, 
this does not negate the fact that in the face of a pliant legislature, the judiciary may be the 
sole body that can prevent the Constitution from being brazenly or capriciously amended.  
However, the doctrine has come under scathing criticism.  It has been said that the basic 
structures doctrine is nebulous and inevitably leads to the executive and the judiciary being 
on a collision course.
75
  Further, the critic against the ‘basic structures’ doctrine has been that 
it would have to be divined by the judiciary.
76
  That is, making the doctrine judge-made vests 
the judges with carte blanche powers to articulate what in their opinion constitutes the basic 
structure of the constitution.
77
 
To prevent the judges divining what constitutes the basic structures of a constitution, the 
drafters of the new constitution in Zimbabwe could look to the South African Constitution.  It 
has been noted that by specifically protecting section 1 of the South African Constitution, the 
drafters have determined the basic structures of the Constitution.
78
  The import of this 
argument is that any amendment which seeks to undermine the values upon which the 
constitutional order is premised, although constitutionally compliant, would be 
unconstitutional if it does not conform to section 74(1) of the Constitution of South Africa.
79
  
However, the preceding approach has two shortcomings.  First, it vests the judges with wide 
discretion in defining what would constitute a ‘value’ in terms of section 1 of the 
Constitution.  Secondly, it means that a dominant party with the required majority could 
erode the constitutional order upon which the state was founded, replacing it with a new type 
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of state that was never envisaged.  It could be argued that there is certainly nothing wrong if 
the people through the parliament – their elected representatives – call for such a change.  
However, this loses sight of the fact that in the age of political party elitism it is doubtful 
whether parliamentarians indeed are the representatives of the people.   
It is submitted that a better approach would be one which couples the threshold required in 
parliament together with a referendum.  Alternatively, the envisaged new constitution could 
expressly articulate the basic structures of the constitution and provide that these cannot be 




 Therefore, it is submitted that the following can be delineated from international law and 
natural law as amounting to the basic structures of a constitution: (i) constitutional democracy 
based on the supremacy of the constitution protected by an independent judiciary; (ii) a 
separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with appropriate checks 
and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness; (iii) the need for 
appropriate checks on governmental power; (iv) representative government embracing multi-
party democracy, a common voters’ roll and in general a mixed electoral system; the 
protection of the constitution against amendment save through special procedures and 
processes; (v) a two term presidential limit; (vi) independent oversight institutions that 
support a constitutional democracy; and (vii) enjoyment of fundamental human rights which 
are justiciable.  Since these features are essential and are irreducible, any amendment which 
has the effect of frustrating them would be unconstitutional. 
Ultimately, whatever the model chosen, sight should not be lost of the fact that the current 
method which makes the amendment process the prerogative of the parliament has made the 
Constitution become a play-thing in the hands of the government.  This has produced dire 
consequences for the rubric of constitutionalism.  Therefore, it is submitted that the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land deserves to be insulated from retrogressive 
amendments otherwise it is not worth the paper it is written on. 
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D) The Lancaster Constitution and the independence of the judiciary 
The independence of the judiciary constitutes one of the hallmarks of constitutional 
democracy.
81
   Mahomed CJ put it succinctly when he said that, ‘[t]he independence of the 
judiciary is crucial.  It constitutes the ultimate shield against that incremental and invisible 
corrosion of our moral universe which is more menacing than direct confrontation with 
visible waves of barbarism.’
82
  It is now trite that an independent judiciary is the bedrock of a 
constitutional democracy.  The existence of an independent judiciary fosters a culture of 
justification and topples the culture of authoritarianism.
83
  It has been noted that the judiciary 
must be independent and perceived to be independent.
84
   
Three characteristics have been identified as forming the core of judicial independence.  
These are: security of tenure; a basic degree of financial security; and institutional 
independence.
85
  Expanding on these three characteristics the Canadian Supreme Court 
described a basic degree of financial independence to mean that the judge had to be ‘free 
from arbitrary interference by the executive in a manner that could affect judicial 
independence’.
86
  Institutional independence was found to encompass independence 
regarding matters that had a direct bearing on the exercise of judicial function.
87
  In the De 
Lange case
88
 the Constitutional Court of South Africa further defined institutional 
independence as meaning that judges should be free from the control of the executive branch.  
It has been propounded that the test for ascertaining the existence of institutional 
independence is an objective one.
89
  This means that a reasonable and right-minded person 
should perceive that the judicial officer is independent and no pressure will be brought to 
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bear on him.  In other words, the judiciary should not only be independent but must also be 
seen to be independent.
90
 
The independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed in the Constitution.  Fombad has 
observed that ‘[a] formal constitutionally entrenched, independent judiciary is absolutely 
essential and a necessary precondition to functional and substantive judicial independence’.
91
  
Thus, a provision vesting the judicial authority exclusively in the judicial organs is a 
prerequisite to ensure that the judiciary is truly independent.  The impact of this argument 
becomes pronounced when regard is had to the fact that the higher courts protect the lower 
courts.
92
  That is, ‘the greater the protection given to the higher courts, the greater is the 
protection that all courts have’.
93
  Therefore, at the very least the independence of the higher 
courts should be constitutionally entrenched because these courts deal with the ‘most 
sensitive areas of tension between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary’.
94
 
 The Constitution of Zimbabwe vests the judicial authority in the courts.
95
  However, 
operating as a claw-back clause, parliament can ‘vest adjudicating functions in a person or 
authority other than a court...’
96
  Such a provision ‘constitutes a serious threat to the 
independence of the judiciary’.
97
  This is because the legislature may bypass the judiciary on 
matters of a sensitive nature by relocating judicial functions to partisan bodies.  This 
happened in the case of Roy Bennett who is a Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
Member of Parliament for Chimanimani.
98
 
 In October 2004 Bennett was convicted and sentenced in terms of the Privileges, 
Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act.  This Act accords judicial functions to Parliament 
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with regard to an act that is judged to be contemptuous.  The matter against Roy Bennett 
arose when, during a parliamentary session on 18 May 2004, Bennett pushed Justice Minister 
Patrick Chinamasa as well as Minister Didymus Mutasa to the floor.  Subsequently, a 
Parliamentary Committee on Privileges was constituted.  The Parliamentary Committee 
which was heavily dominated by ZANU-PF members recommended that Bennett be 
sentenced to fifteen months’ hard labour, three of which would be suspended.  On 28 October 
2005 by a vote of 53 to 42 (which was along party lines) the recommendation was acceded to.  
Having served nine months, Bennett was released in June 2005.
99
  This has the effect of 
rendering the legislators impotent, and impinging on their right to freely express their views 
in parliament for fear of reprisal.  In a different context, the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
South Africa declared unconstitutional a resolution through which parliament had suspended 
one of its members.
100
  The court opined that the resolution was unconstitutional because it 
unreasonably curtailed Ms De Lille’s right to freedom of expression in parliament.
101
   
It is submitted that the courts in South Africa have been able to intervene and strike down 
any exercise of executive which is at odds with the constitution primarily because the 
constitution exclusively vests the judicial authority in the courts.  In light of this, the 
recommendation by the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) 
report that the new constitution could adequately safeguard the principle of judicial 
independence by giving exclusive authority to the courts is apposite.
102
 
 Judicial independence is secured if the appointment process is permeated by an aura of 
openness and transparency.  Although there is no rule of thumb on how the appointment of 
judges ought to be made, the process has to be imbued with sufficient checks.  The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that ‘the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, Judge 
President and other judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court shall be appointed by 
the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission’.
103
  The phrase “after 
consultation” is defined in section 115(1) to mean that the President is not bound by the 
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advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
104
  Further it states that ‘if the appointment of a 
Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, Judge President or Judge of the Supreme Court or High 
Court is not consistent with any recommendation made by the Judicial Service Commission 
in terms of subsection (1) the President shall cause the Senate to be informed as soon as 
practicable’.
105
  Ultimately, it means that although the President has to hear the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC) he is nonetheless not bound by its advice.  Moreover, 
section 84(2) is redundant because it does not clarify what the Senate is required to do in the 
circumstances.  
 Therefore, it appears that the President exercises the final decision as to who is appointed 
to the bench.  Thus, the President is vested with wide discretion when it comes to appointing 
judges, and this creates the perception that individuals appointed to the bench are likely to do 
the bidding of the President.  It would seem that a salient check on the powers of the 
President is removed, enabling the President to pack the bench with partisan individuals who 
are pliant to his/her wishes.  
 Furthermore, this is at odds with the Latimer House Guidelines.
106
  These provide that, ‘in 
jurisdictions that do not already have an appropriate independent process in place, judicial 
appointments should be made on merit by a judicial services commission or by an appropriate 
officer of state acting on the advice of such a commission’.
107
  The Namibian model might be 
instructive to those tasked with engineering a new constitution for Zimbabwe.  The Namibian 
Constitution provides that ‘all appointments of judges to the Supreme Court and High Court 
shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the JSC...’
108
  Thus, judges are 
insulated from political influence since the President has no discretion but to act on the 
recommendation of the JSC.   
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In a seminal case, the Constitutional Court of South Africa invalidated a legislation that 
purported to empower the President to extend the tenure of the Chief Justice.
109
  The JASA 
case
110
 illustrates the proposition that judicial independence is a facet of separation of powers 
which in turn is informed by the rule of law.  The subtext underpinning the reasoning of the 
Constitutional Court appears to have been the perception that would be created if the 
President was to be allowed to have carte blanche powers in extending the tenure of a 
Constitutional Court judge.  In censuring the impugned provision, the court noted that the 
wide discretion given to the President by the Act had the potential to ‘raise a reasonable 
apprehension or perception that the independence of the Chief Justice and by corollary the 
judiciary may be undermined by external interference of the Executive’.
111
 
Through the case it is evident that judicial independence constitutes a fundamental 
hallmark of constitutionalism.  The case shows that the process of extending the tenure of a 
judicial officer (and by corollary the appointment of a judicial officer) must not vest 
exclusively in the Executive.  The reason is that if the President has wide discretion in 
appointing judicial officer or extending their terms, the judiciary may be perceived to lack 
real independence.  Furthermore, it may communicate to the public that the judiciary – which 
is supposed to be the guardian angels ensuring that government complies with the 
Constitution – is likely to do the bidding of the government.  Such a perception not only 
undermines the integrity of the judiciary but it also stifles the edifice of constitutional 
democracy.  
The body responsible for the appointment of judges has to be independent of the President.   
The Constitution provides that the JSC is to be composed of six members, who are the Chief 
Justice, the Attorney-General, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission and a total of 
three others members appointed by the President.
112
  It has been contended that this is an 
example of a body dominated by presidential appointees.
113
  This assessment is valid because 
although the Constitution provides that the President appoints three members directly; the 
Chief Justice, the Attorney-General and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission are 
indirectly appointed by the President.  Therefore, the prospect of judicial independence in 
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Zimbabwe is diminished since the JSC is somewhat of a fiefdom of the President.  On paper 
the South African Constitution provides for a greater scope of independence of the judiciary 
by thwarting political meddling in the composition of the JSC.
114
  Therefore, it could be 
instructive to adopt the approach used in South Africa. 
The manner in which judges can be removed from office has a bearing on the 
independence of the judiciary.  This is because institutional independence and security of 
tenure are some of the basic pillars of judicial independence.
115
  The Latimer House 
Guidelines limit the removal of a judge to the inability to perform judicial duties and serious 
misconduct.
116
  According to the Latimer House Guidelines, such a removal can only be 
effected after a ruling by an independent and impartial tribunal to that effect.  The 
Constitution distinguishes between the removal of the Chief Justice and the removal of other 
judges.
117
  The President is granted power to initiate the removal proceedings of the Chief 
Justice.
118
  If the removal does not concern the Chief Justice, it is him/her who advises the 
President, who then appoints a tribunal.
119
  Tasking the tribunal with investigating whether or 
not adequate grounds for removal exist is not only in tandem with the Latimer House 
Guidelines, it also ensures that judicial officers are not removed at the dictates of the 
President.  Further the President is bound by the tribunal’s findings.   
Notwithstanding the presence of safeguards in the constitutional text, the government of 
Zimbabwe has been charged with using extraneous means to remove the judicial officers 
from office.
120
  In a show of total disregard for the rule of law and manifest disrespect of the 
court system, on 24 November 2000 a mob of government supporters invaded the buildings 
of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.
121
  They waved placards, chanted political slogans and 
threatened the judges.
122
  Such use of extralegal means has dealt a heavy blow to the 
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independence of the judiciary.  As a result of this, the judiciary in Zimbabwe has been 
damningly assessed as a “cornucopia of contextual irrelevance”.
123
 
The judiciary in Zimbabwe is hamstrung by the Constitution which does not adequately 
entrench the independence of the judiciary.
124
  The government has employed various 
stratagems against the judiciary; some legal and others extra-legal.
125
  One such strategy has 
been through the “campaign of vilification”.
126
  That is, judges viewed as “hostile” to the 
policies of the government have been hounded out of office so as to pack the bench with 
pliant judges.
127
  The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Anthony 
Gubbay notes that the government of Zimbabwe has had an avowed policy of appointing, ‘as 
judges to both the Supreme and High Courts, persons known to be sympathetic to its political 
ideology’.
128
  Gubbay contends that the government has largely been successful in its avowed 
policy.
129
   
 In the year 2000 the government, under the guise of “war veterans”, orchestrated a series 
of farm invasions.
130
  The Supreme Court invalidated the farm invasions, but the order was 
disregarded and disobeyed by the government.
131
  Gubbay, who was the Chief Justice at that 
time, notes that the order did not preclude the government from engaging in land reform.
132
  
Rather, the Supreme Court was criticising the haphazard and arbitrary manner in which the 
land resettlement had been implemented.
133
  The Supreme Court noted: 
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Wicked things have been done, and continue to be done.  They must be stopped. Common 
law crimes have been, and are being, committed with impunity.  Laws made by Parliament 
have been flouted by government. The activities of the past months must be condemned.
134
     
However, the call fell on deaf ears as the government no longer respected the courts.  This 
shows an endemic culture of defying court orders which the government does not favour.  It 
is submitted that respect for the orders of the court are central if the rule of law is to be 
sustained. 
For judicial independence to prevail, Africa requires a mould of political leaders who have 
respect for the courts.  Nelson Mandela, the former President of South Africa is an illustration 
of a leader upholding the rule of law.  In a television broadcast after the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling in the case of Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President 
of the Republic of South Africa 
135
 he said: 
The Constitutional Court has declared invalid proclamations which I made. At the time I was 
assured by my legal advisors that I had the authority and power to do so. I fully accept the 
decision of the Constitutional Court. We all act under the Constitution and I, as President 




This statement can be contrasted with that of President Mugabe of Zimbabwe.  He said 
that, ‘the courts can do whatever they want, but no judicial decision will stand in our way ... 
my own position is that we should not even be defending our position in the courts... .’
137
  
This statement is in stark contrast with that of Mandela and reveals a lack of commitment to 
the principle of judicial independence.  Thus, Africa needs leaders such as Mandela who will 
show fidelity to the Constitution and accordingly, to the independence of the courts 
regardless of the outcome of the decision. 
 The independence of the judiciary is achieved if the remuneration of the judges is secured 
by law.  In terms of the Constitution, salaries of the judges are to be paid from a Fund 
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  However, judges were recently given ad hoc gifts by the 
executive.
139
  This leads to the view that the courts have been ‘softened’ by the executive so 
as to do the bidding of the executive.  This has given credence to the argument that a volte 
face of the stance of the court on the land reform is as a result of the court accepting these 
gifts.
140
  The IBAHRI report argues that this is incompatible with judicial independence.
141
  
According to the report the appropriate means to tackle deteriorating salaries in the face of 
spiralling inflation would be to make payments through formalised legislative means.
142
   
Independence of the judiciary is secured when the judiciary has administrative and 
budgetary autonomy.  This is because when the government controls the staff and the purse 
of the judiciary, it amounts to the control of the judiciary.  The importance of the courts being 
in control of its purse strings was noted by the former Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice 
Ismail Mahomed who observed that if the executive pulled the purse strings: 
The courts could easily be reduced to paper tigers with a ferocious capacity to snarl and roar 
but no teeth with which to bite and no sinews to execute their judgments, which may then be 
mockingly reduced to pieces of sterile scholarship, toothless wisdom or pious poetry.
143
  
 The Constitution of Ghana provides for a greater scope of judicial independence since the 
administrative functions are vested in the Chief Justice.  In that country the task of ensuring 
that justice is dispensed efficiently lies with the Independent Judicial Council.
144
  The 
approach in Ghana shows that the Constitution has gone to great lengths to ensure that the 
judiciary is adequately insulated from political influence.  In the context of South Africa it 
has been realised that having the executive or legislature control the administration of the 
judiciary constitutes an affront to judicial independence.  Thus, the Office of the Chief Justice 
has been created and vested with power to govern its own administration.
145
  This model 
preserves and secures the independence of the judiciary because of the fact that the judiciary 
is able to claim its place as a co-equal among the three arms of government. 
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 It is submitted that giving administrative autonomy to the judiciary ensures that 
institutional independence is protected.  The Constitutional Court in South Africa has 
identified that administrative independence is inextricably linked to institutional 
independence.
146
  Thus, it would seem that in an instance whereby the executive controls the 
administration of the judiciary, the prospects of judicial independence diminish considerably. 
Therefore, in crafting the new constitution the notion of judicial independence should not 
be viewed as a by-product of democracy, but as a cornerstone of democracy.
147
  This is 
because of the fact that the judiciary is the least dangerous branch since it has no influence 
over either the sword or the purse.
148
  Thus, if judicial independence is to thrive it needs a 
constitution which does not merely window dress the independence of the judiciary, but 
rather entrenches such independence.  Ultimately, although the constitution may provide the 
judiciary with the constitutional power it needs, the extent to which constitutionalism will 
thrive rests with the judges.  Prempeh notes that the ‘philosophic attitudes, background and 
assumptions, and outlook that judges bring to the task of interpreting the constitutional text’ 
is determinant on whether constitutionalism will thrive.
149
 
E) The Lancaster Constitution and the oversight bodies that foster constitutionalism 
The United Nations adopted the Paris Principles which calls upon member states to establish 
national institutions tasked with the mandate to promote and protect human rights.
150
  It 
cannot be gainsaid that Africa, particularly Zimbabwe, is facing a challenge when it comes to 
accountability.  Therefore, accountability can only be fostered if its principles are 
constitutionalised.  That is, every Constitution which is crafted should incorporate institutions 
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  Therefore, accountability should not be an afterthought but 
has to be construed as part and parcel of constitutionalism.   
Institutions that foster accountability constitute a fundamental tenet of constitutionalism.  
These institutions include inter alia, the Ombudsman; the Human rights commission; the 
Anti-corruption commission; the Auditor-General; the Electoral commission; the Media 
commission; the Independent Prosecuting authority and the Judicial service commission.
152
  
The envisaged new constitution should provide for the inclusion of these oversight 
institutions.  This is because the non-existence of these institutions undermines the promotion 
of constitutionalism and accountability.   
The subsequent discussion on these institutions will be confined to the following 
institutions namely; the Public Protector; the Human Rights Commission; and the Electoral 
Commission.  The choice of these institutions is not because there ought to be a hierarchy 
amongst oversight institutions, but it is because of a two-fold rationale.  First, the arguments 
made with regard to these three institutions apply with greater force to other oversight 
institutions.  Secondly, the context of the country of analysis necessitates the discussion.  The 
country has been said to have a culture of human rights abuse; a system of government which 
is based on patronage and corruption; and elections which have been marred by violence and 
fraud. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe establishes the office of the Public Protector.
153
  In terms 
of that section the Public Protector is appointed after consultation with the Judicial Service 
Commission and the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.
154
  This provision may be 
criticised for granting the President carte blanche in the appointment process.  This is as a 
result of the fact that the phrase “after consultation” has to be interpreted to mean that the 
President is not bound by the advice of the JSC and the Committee on Standing Rules and 
Orders.
155
  It is submitted that a better approach is the one provided in the Constitution of 
South Africa.
156
  Section 193 provides that the legislature be involved in the appointment 
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process.  However, a shortcoming of the South African constitutional context is the 
distinction it makes between the appointment of the Public Protector and the Auditor-
General, and the rest of the commissioners of other oversight institutions.  The Constitution 
of South Africa requires a special majority in the appointment of the Public Protector and the 
Auditor-General,
157
 while a simple majority would suffice in the appointment of other 
commissioners.
158
  It has been argued that this might have the ‘unintended consequence of 
creating a hierarchy of Chapter 9 institutions’.
159
 
  It is submitted that the new constitution should not make a distinction in the appointment 
of commissioners.  An appropriate process would be one which divests the President of the 
wide discretion he possesses, and provide for the involvement of the entire legislature in the 
process.  In the age of dominant political party rule, this ensures that the voices of minority 
parties are heard.  It also curbs the appointment of individuals who are perceived to be 
compliant to the diktat of politicians. 
The Public Protector may be removed from office if found unable to discharge the 
functions of office.
160
  The body tasked with making such a finding is a tribunal which is 
composed of a chairman (who is supposed to be or has been a judge of the Supreme Court or 
High Court) and two members appointed by the President.
161
  It is submitted that this process 
is flawed.  A better method would be the one which fetters the discretion of the President by 
providing for the involvement of the legislature in the removal process.  This would ensure 
that the tenure of office of the Public Protector, and other commissioners of oversight 
institutions, is secured since their ‘office inherently entails investigation of sensitive and 
potentially embarrassing affairs of government’.
162
   
The Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that the tenure of office of the Public Protector 
would be determined in terms of national legislation.  It is submitted that the tenure of office 
should not be left to the design of the legislature, but should be expressly entrenched in the 
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constitution.  In that regard, the tenure of office for the Public Protector (as well as 
commissioners of other oversight institutions) should be a non-renewable term which is 
reasonably long.  This is advantageous as it achieves the twin goals of providing incumbents 
with security of tenure while simultaneously ensuring that expertise and experience is 
retained in the institution.
163
  The defect with a renewable term is that it might have the 
consequences of bringing pressure to bear on the incumbent.  Further, the appointment of 
commissioners should be on a ‘staggered basis’.
164
  The advantage of this is that it prevents a 
situation whereby commissioners leave simultaneously, thereby resulting in the loss of 
experience and expertise. 
However, as the South African context indicates, the ultimate success of the office of the 
Public Protector (or any of the other oversight institutions) rests on the appointees staffing 
them.  Those tasked with leading these institutions should display independence, impartiality 
and competence.  These attributes bolster the public perception that these oversight 
institutions are able to act as a sufficient counterweight against abuse of power by those in 
positions of government.  Whereas, docility and timidity by those at the helm of these bodies 
creates the perception that the last line of defence against arbitrary exercise of power is weak.  
This perception stifles the chances of constitutionalism succeeding.  
  The veracity of the preceding comments is highlighted by the manner in which the office 
of the Public Protector in South Africa has fared.  Under the current Public Protector 
Advocate Thuli Madonsela public confidence in the institution has buoyed.  This is evident 
by the number of complaints her office has received.
165
  Furthermore, through some of her 
findings she has made immense contributions to constitutionalism.
166
  She has certainly 
heeded to the advice given by the Supreme Court of Appeal to her predecessor.
167
  The court 
stressed that the Constitution guarantees that the office of the Public Protector must exercise 
                                                          
163
 Hatchard et al op cit note 24 at 216. 
164




The finding by the Public Protector that the South African Police Service and the Department of Public 
Works acted unlawfully and unconstitutionally in signing a lease agreement. This finding has led to the sacking 
of Police Commissioner Bheki Cele. See www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Bheki-Cele-fired-20120612. 
167
 Public Protector v Mail and Guardian Ltd 2011(4) SA 420 (SCA) where the court found that the decision by 
the Public Protector not to investigate the transaction between Imvume and the ANC was out of kilter with the 
injunctions of the Constitution.  
87 
 
its powers ‘without fear, favour of prejudice’.
168
  It was advised that these powers could only 
be fulfilled if the Public Protector acted courageously, vigilantly and purposefully.
169
 
Hitherto, the electoral situation in Zimbabwe has been marred by violence and fraud.  The 
electoral system in Zimbabwe is out of kilter with international best standards which have 
progressed towards election commissions being autonomous and independent of the state. 
Sachikonye has noted that the ‘institutional framework of electoral management is a 
cumbersome framework with multiple actors’.
170
  Briefly, the institutional framework 
consisted of the Delimitation Commission, the Electoral Supervisory Commission, Election 
Directorate and Registrar General’s Office.  Out of these, the Registrar General was ‘actually 
the key player in the electoral processes’.
171
  
 This compromised the entire system of the electoral system because the Registrar General 
was a civil servant whose impartiality and independence from the state has been highly 
questionable.  Thus, Zimbabwe has not complied with the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections which call for the establishment of impartial, competent and 
accountable national electoral bodies.
172
  The voter’s roll is in a shambles
173
 and the 
delimitation of boundaries has been politicised.
174
  This has led to elections in Zimbabwe, 
like those in other parts of Africa, being ‘little more than a theatrical setting for the self-
representation and self-reproduction of power’.
175
  
 Currently, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is the body responsible for the 
handling of elections in Zimbabwe.
176
  The appointment process used for the ZEC is akin to 
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that utilised for the appointment of the Public Protector.
177
  Therefore, the criticism given 
against the appointment process of the Public Protector also applies.  It could be added that 
the approach in South Africa by providing that the committee tasked with appointing 
members be proportionally composed of members from all parties represented in the 
Assembly ensures that the committee is not staffed by the majority party. 
Differing markedly from the removal of the Public Protector where a tribunal has to be 
constituted, a commissioner of the ZEC may be removed by the President if the JSC and the 
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders approves.
178
  The grounds which may trigger 
removal are namely the inability to exercise the functions of office; misconduct; 
incompetence; or disqualification.
179
  It is submitted that this approach does not properly 
insulate the commissioners from political pressure and does not adequately secure the tenure 
of office.  The approach in Malawi could be an inspiration to the drafters of the new 
constitution.  The removal process is removed from the presidency and the President’s role is 
that of formal endorsement after the process has been completed.
180
  Alternatively, the 
constitution could follow the approach in South Africa which envisages a three stage process 
in the removal of commissioners.
181
  Since the President is enjoined to abide by the decision 
of the National Assembly it has been submitted that the discretion of the President in the 
Constitution of South Africa is ‘purely mechanical’.
182
 
A salient question for consideration is whether the removal of a commissioner should be 
justiciable.  Govender submits that judicial oversight over the removal process is 
advantageous because it ensures that the power to remove is exercised in accordance with the 
strictures of the constitution.
183
  Therefore, the process should not be beyond the reach of the 
law, but courts could enquire into the decision albeit with a measure of respect or deference.  
The utility of embracing the principle of legality becomes apparent in this regard.  The 
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principle of legality would ensure that the level of scrutiny is less exacting as it will be 
confined to rationality.  Such a requirement will ensure that the commissioners do enjoy 
independence and are properly insulated from political persecution.   
The tenure of office for commissioners in the ZEC is two terms.
184
  However, an evident 
shortcoming in this provision is that the term is renewable after a period of six years.  It is 
submitted that a non-renewable term is to be favoured since a renewable term might bring 
pressure to bear on the incumbent.  In so far as the Constitution has dealt with the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Commission, it has attempted to conform to the international standards.
185
  To 
a significant extent it achieves this, but there are certain shortcomings identifiable in that 
section.  One such example is the appointment process which grants the President unfettered 
discretion in the appointment of commissioners.  It has been highlighted in the preceding 
analysis that this is incompatible with the independence requirement made salient in the Paris 
Principles.  In terms of the Paris Principles, guarantees must exist which would ‘ensure the 
pluralist representation of the social forces [of civilian society] involved in the protection and 
promotion of human rights’.
186
 
In chapter III it was observed that oversight institutions can only have a measure of 
independence and impartiality if members staffing it are independent appointees who enjoy 
satisfactory conditions of employment, and they are in an institution which is funded 
adequately and resourced properly.  Therefore, in light of the analysis a few 
recommendations would suffice. 
  First, it is imperative that individuals appointed to these institutions not only be 
independent but also be perceived to be independent.  This could be ensured by making sure 
that the appointment process is imbued with sufficient checks.  It was highlighted above that 
one such way would be to make the process far removed from the executive.  Secondly, the 
process of removing commissioners of these institutions should be circumscribed.  The merit 
in such an approach is that the commissioners would do their work without fear of being 
removed from office.  Thirdly, the commissioners should be able to enjoy satisfactory 
conditions of employment.  This could be achieved by making their salary not subject to 
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reduction.  Also, the tenure of office should be a reasonably long period which is non-
renewable.   
Lastly, oversight institutions should have administrative and budgetary autonomy.  The 
rationale for this is that controlling the purse strings and staff of an institution inevitably 
amounts to controlling the institution itself.  It is not being argued here that the oversight 
institutions should not be accountable.  Rather, what is being contended is that accountability 
does not equate to supervision.  This distinction was recognised in the case of the New 
National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa.
187
  The Court 
held that the oversight institutions were not state departments.
188
  Further, it was found that 
independence entailed both financial independence and administrative independence.
189
  The 
court defined financial independence to mean that the institution must be sufficiently funded 
in order for it to fulfil its mandate.
190
  It was stated that Parliament, and not the executive was 
the arm enjoined to determine the budget of these institutions.
191
  Administrative 
independence was defined as affording the institutions the requisite powers to administer 
control over matters that were directly connected to its mandate.
192
 
Ultimately, although the Constitution of Zimbabwe does establish some of these oversight 
institutions, they are yet to make significant gains.  This can be attributed to the fact that the 
functions of these institutions are limited in scope, thus rendering their powers illusory.  
Furthermore, there has been lack of political will by the government to promote and protect 
the institutional independence of these oversight bodies.  This stems from the perception that 
these bodies are “hostile”
193
 and as such their powers have to be limited. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates the dearth of independent oversight institutions 
which are prerequisites if the ethos of constitutionalism is to take root in Zimbabwe.
194
   In 
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sum, if real independence for these institutions is to be secured, the new constitution should 
ensure that the basic structure of these institutions is detailed in the constitution; these 
institutions have wide powers to ensure that they are both reactive and proactive; and these 
institutions are accessible to the poor and marginalised in the society.
195
  Zimbabwe continues 
to falter under the colossal weight of presidential absolutism.  However, the presence of 
independent oversight institutions vested with real powers might act as a counterpoise to 




This chapter has shown that the Constitution of Zimbabwe is a ‘constitution without 
constitutionalism’.
197
  The Constitution has all the trappings of legality and the veneer of 
constitutionalism.  For instance, the Constitution provides for a semblance of separation of 
powers which envisages an effective legislature and an independent judiciary.  However, the 
reality starkly contradicts this and unmasks the Constitution of Zimbabwe for what it is – ‘an 
instrument for autocratic control, legitimising rather than preventing arbitrary power’.
198
  
Through a series of amendments to the constitution, power has been centralised in the 
executive branch of government.
199
   The judiciary has been cowed into submission and the 
legislature has been reduced to a rubber stamp body of the executive. 
Thus, the constitutional drafting process presents an opportune moment not only of 
crafting a new document but also of creating a document imbued with constitutionalism.
200
  
There is no gainsaying that constitutionalism, good governance and sustainable development 
is the quest to which Zimbabwe and the whole of Africa is striving.
201
  Therefore, if this is to 
be achieved, the Constitution of Zimbabwe has to undergo a legitimate seismic shift towards 
constitutionalism.  Tentatively the new constitution should provide for separation of powers 
entrenching checks and balances; an independent judiciary which is exclusively vested with 
                                                          
195
 Fombad, The Constitution as a Source of Accountability op cit note 91 at 61. 
196
 Prempeh, Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective op cit note 53 at 832. 
197
 H Okoth-Ogendo ‘Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox’ in I 
Shivji (ed) State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy (1991) 3, 3. 
198
 Alex Magaisa ‘Constitutionality versus constitutionalism: Lessons for Zimbabwe’s constitutional reform 
process’51, 52, available at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/30495/1/Submission4.pdf, accessed on 30 April 2012. 
199




 Hatchard op cit note 24 at 2. 
92 
 
adjudicatory functions; presidential term limits; independent oversight bodies and a 

























James Madison once remarked that: ‘If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary’.
202
  The reality however, is that men govern over men, and thus the perennial 
problem has been how to create controls on the power of those who govern while at the same 
time ensuring that government is not rendered impotent.  This dissertation has shown that 
constitutionalism provides the answer.   Constitutionalism ensures equilibrium between two 
desires, namely that the government does not become tyrannical and that it is not pushed to 
paralysis.  
In summary, this dissertation has considered the fundamental tenets which have 
crystallised into the core elements of constitutionalism.  The core elements of 
constitutionalism have been identified in chapter III as including, (i) the provision for the 
recognition of fundamental human rights; (ii) the separation of powers; (iii) presidential term 
limits; (iv) the independence of the judiciary; (v) the review of the constitutionality of laws; 
(vi) controlling amendment of the constitution; and (vii) establishment of oversight bodies.  
Further, the dissertation has highlighted that rule of law is a conditio sine qua non for 
constitutionalism.  In the same vein, an argument to the effect that constitutionalism and 
democracy are interdependent has been made. 
After the core elements of constitutionalism were identified and discussed, an analysis of 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe was conducted.  Although the Constitution has the veneer of 
constitutionalism, it was found in substance to lack these attributes.  It was found that the 
current constitution undermines the doctrine of separation of powers.  Ideally, the balance of 
power between the three arms of government has to be maintained at equilibrium.  However, 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe does the exact opposite of this.  Power has been skewed in 
favour of the executive arm of government.  In analysing the constitution it has been noted 
that not incorporating a presidential term limit in the constitution has provided a breeding 
ground for a system of government based on patronage.  The analysis has found that the 
dearth of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe has been as a result of the accumulation of the 
absence of constitutional provisions entrenching the independence of the judiciary; lack of a 
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fortified process in amending the constitution; and the non-existence of independent 
oversight institutions monitoring the exercise of public power. 
Therefore, if the new constitution is ‘to create the preconditions for a well-functioning 
democratic order’
203
 it must make a number of salient constitutional reforms.  First, the 
anticipated constitution should provide for a system of separation of powers which entrenches 
checks and balances.   The constitution should curb the excessive powers arrogated by the 
president allowing for impunity and patronage.  This can be done through limiting the powers 
of the president in making key appointments.  Another way through which unbridled 
executive powers could be controlled is by term limiting the tenure of the President.  It is 
submitted that entrenching two terms as the maximum number of terms an incumbent may be 
in office as President, curbs the proclivity to cling to power which accentuates autocracy.  
Also, the principle of legality which has been used in South Africa can be adopted.  The 
principle of legality will ensure that the power to pardon or the exercise of any other public 
power is transformed from being based on personal favour to being one sourced in 
accordance with the injunctions of the constitution.   
 Secondly, to ensure that the judiciary is not the hand-maiden of the executive, the body 
responsible in the appointment process should be independent of political interference.  This 
can be ensured through reducing the number of political appointees in the body.  The 
independence of the judiciary can be augmented by allowing the judiciary to control its own 
administration and finances.  Currently, the judiciary has to go cap in hand to the government 
seeking alms.  This greatly undermines the prospects of judicial independence.  Therefore, it 
is submitted that the new constitution should provide the judiciary with administrative and 
budgetary autonomy. 
Thirdly, oversight bodies which foster constitutionalism should be established.  To ensure 
the independence of these institutions and curb political meddling, their powers should be 
entrenched in the constitution.  The appointment and removal process of commissioners 
staffing these bodies should at the very least be removed from the terrain of the Presidency.  
Furthermore, the provisions dealing with the powers of these institutions must be couched in 
both positive and negative imperatives.  That is, the other arms of government should be 
enjoined to assist these institutions in fulfilling their mandate.  This provides scope for the 
                                                          
203
 C Sunstein ‘Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do’ 1 ed (2001) 6. 
95 
 
entering into of Memorandum of Understandings between the institutions and government 
departments with the latter pledging not to impede the former in fulfilling its objectives.  
Lastly, to prevent the constitution from being a play-thing in the hands of the government, 
the process providing for the amendment of the constitution should be more cumbersome.
204
 
Towards this end, the constitution could provide that certain provisions can only be amended 
if a threshold of voters approve of it in a referendum.  Further, the Constitution could 
explicitly embrace the basic structures doctrine.  This will ensure that constitutional 
amendments which undermine the structure of the constitution do not pass constitutional 
muster. 
Certainly, three decades after Zimbabwe attained independence, a ‘constitution without 
constitutionalism’
205
 is now anachronistic.  What is needed is a constitution which fosters 
constitutionalism by recognising that there are fundamental tenets which are foundational in a 
democratic political order.  Ultimately, for constitutionalism to take root, what is required is a 
new mindset on the part of those in government.
206
  This new mindset should hold dear the 
fundamental tenets of constitutionalism.  Otherwise failure to do that will mean that the 
country will continue to wobble under political conundrums in perpetuity.  This is because it 
is only ‘[o]nce a country has crossed the constitutionalism Rubicon [that] the chances of 
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